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ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I argue that some truths about our constitutional order are 
best left misunderstood. I do so by defending a self-deception at the core of our 
discourse on constitutionalism. We tend to speak as if our constitutional sys-
tem rests upon an uncompromising inquiry into constitutional meaning. Yet 
all viable interpretive theories privilege some concerns above such meaning, 
however they define it. This paradox, I argue, arises from the tension between 
parallel constitutional commitments to Enlightenment thought and the com-
mon law tradition. The paradox preserves, in my view, an appearance of co-
herence that is as vital as it is false. In elevating an Enlightenment ideal that 
belies our common law culture, we perpetuate a redemptive vision of constitu-
tionalism capable of binding us together even as conflicts over constitutional 
meaning drive us apart. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose you are convinced.  You ascend Mount Sinai and behold 
a vision of constitutional truth.  It is not a vision of constitutional 
commandments; earlier pilgrims to Sinai etched the commandments 
of American government into the written Constitution.  Here on Si-
nai, those pilgrims divined the true constitutional text.  At the same 
spot, you behold something different:  the intricacies of constitution-
al practice, past and present.  If those past pilgrims followed in Mo-
ses’s footsteps as transcriber of the Ten Commandments,1 you follow 
in his footsteps as transcriber of the Torah.2  At least, you will if you 
share your vision with the public. 
 
 1 This reference, of course, is to Moses’s ascent to Mount Sinai.  There, God “gave unto 
Moses . . . two tables of testimony, tables of stone, written with the finger of God.”  Exodus 
31:18 (King James). 
 2 Rabbinic scholars have long held that Moses transcribed the first five books of the Torah 
through divine inspiration atop Mount Sinai.  See RICHARD ELLIOTT FRIEDMAN, WHO 
WROTE THE BIBLE? 17–32 (1987). 
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The parallel with the Torah betrays both the promise and the lim-
its of your vision on Sinai.  You perceive every detail that circum-
scribes the Constitution, from the intentions of the Framers, to the 
thinking of individual judges, to the evolving preferences of the citi-
zenry.  For you, what was once unknowable becomes knowable.  You 
may assess empirical claims about the facts now available to you, and 
you may assess the fidelity of theories that transform those facts into 
constructions of constitutional meaning.3  Yet your vision cannot en-
sure interpretive agreement as to constitutional meaning.  Sinai does 
not somehow provide a constitutional “view from nowhere.”4  The 
Constitution contains no commandment specifying how it is to be in-
terpreted, and even if it did, that commandment would require in-
terpretation.5  Your vision might make a theory more attractive than 
others, but it cannot settle ultimate questions of meaning.6 
Still, revelation yields possibility.  Suppose you return from Sinai 
and perceive that our contemporary constitutional order is rife with 
falsehood and misunderstanding.  Some people purposefully misrep-
resent constitutional truth in order to reach certain outcomes.  Oth-
ers fail to see what they miscomprehend.  Falsehoods and misunder-
standing both create and obscure inconsistencies within interpretive 
accounts of constitutional meaning.  That is, suppose the people fail 
to arrive at the constitutional meaning dictated by different interpre-
tive approaches because they miscomprehend the sources underlying 
that meaning.  Here lies the possibility.  Perhaps, the people will 
heed your newfound wisdom and eliminate the falsehoods and in-
congruities that pervade our constitutional order.  What do you tell 
them?  Do you follow Moses and share the truth? 
This may seem like an odd set of questions.  Of course you share 
the truth—or so holds conventional wisdom.  Falsehood and misun-
 
 3 In this Article, the term “constitutional truth” refers to empirical facts relevant to consti-
tutional interpretation.  By contrast, the term “constitutional meaning” refers to the con-
clusions drawn from empirical facts through the act of interpretation.  For further discus-
sion on the distinction between empirical fact and interpretive conclusions from the 
perspective of Mount Sinai, see infra Part I.A.3. 
 4 In his “View From Nowhere,” Thomas Nagel sought to “combine the perspective of a par-
ticular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and 
his viewpoint included.”  THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 3 (1986). 
 5 Notably, however, the Constitution does contain language addressing how it should not 
be interpreted.  The Ninth Amendment provides that “[t]he enumeration in the Consti-
tution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
 6 For the same reason, only the original constitutional text can become apparent on Sinai.  
To recognize subsequent alterations to the text requires a theory of interpretation as to 
their legitimacy. 
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derstanding threaten to distort the true meaning of our constitution-
al commandments.  Fidelity to those commandments, however, con-
ceived interpretively, is the overarching project of constitutionalism.  
Constitutional theorists labor to unearth truth about our constitu-
tional system in order to perfect the fidelity of practice.  Litigants la-
bor to reveal the truth of constitutional meaning, even if that truth 
has long been hidden from the courts.  Judges parse the legal inter-
pretations presented by litigants with an eye for the truth.  Or, so the 
narrative goes.  We seek coherence in law and rue misunderstandings 
that allow inconsistencies to persist.  The course for you, then, is 
clear:  speak and be thorough.     
 I will push back against this conventional wisdom.  I hope to con-
vince you to proceed from Sinai with trepidation.  As you descend 
from Sinai, I argue, you should think about what should be spoken 
and what should remain unspoken.    
 Rather than delve into how you might address particular revela-
tions uncovered on Sinai, I take aim at the conventional wisdom it-
self.  I contend that the notion that we must share our visions from 
Sinai is a valuable self-deception at the core of our constitutional or-
der.  This argument combines a descriptive claim with a normative 
one.  Descriptively, I argue that our constitutional order does not 
share the conventional view’s unwavering disdain for falsehood and 
inconsistency.  Normatively, I argue that our acceptance of falsehood 
and inconsistency is vital to the survival of that order.  From this, it 
follows that there is at least one truth visible from Sinai that would 
best remain unspoken.     
 The descriptive argument develops a dichotomy between two po-
lar elements present in our constitutional order:  the common law 
culture and the Enlightenment ideal.  Born of the Enlightenment, 
our constitutional system carries forward a tradition steeped in the 
notion that we may reason to an understanding of abstract political 
truth.  In this vein, we view the Constitution as an instrument of truth 
that eschews the falsehood and inconsistency that afflicted prior po-
litical orders.  Yet, while the Constitution may have been born in a 
time of enlightenment, it was also born within a common law tradi-
tion.  That tradition is not impervious to conceptual order and the 
dictates of abstract reason, but in many ways it actively preserves the 
mythology and disjunction decried by Enlightenment thought.  We 
speak of the Constitution as an Enlightenment project, yet we prac-
tice constitutionalism in a manner antithetical to the Enlightenment 
tenets we espouse.  This contradiction persistently evades recogni-
tion. 
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The normative argument defends this state of affairs.  In isolation, 
neither the common law culture nor the Enlightenment ideal ade-
quately advances our collective constitutional goals.  Accordingly, we 
face a choice of either setting boundaries between these two strands 
of constitutional thought and preserving a state of either latent or 
overt contradiction between them.  I argue that no satisfying and 
precise boundaries exist between the common law culture and the 
Enlightenment ideal, a claim to which our constitutional discourse 
can readily attest.  Recognizing the present state of contradiction be-
tween the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, moreo-
ver, would threaten the stability of our constitutional order.  A state 
of latent contradiction, by contrast, would maintain an appearance of 
order and principle within our constitutional system that is, in my 
view, vital to its preservation.  On Sinai, then, you should refrain from 
exposing the mythic quality of the Enlightenment ideal.  
 This Article proceeds as follows:  Part I develops a typology of the 
mythology and disjunction that you might discern on Sinai.  Part II 
introduces the Enlightenment ideal through the lens of mythology 
and disjunction.  Part III discusses how our common law culture un-
dermines the Enlightenment ideal, again through the lens of my-
thology and disjunction.  Part IV discusses how scholars have navi-
gated the tension between the common law culture and the 
Enlightenment ideal.  Part V defends the Enlightenment ideal as a 
beneficial legal myth opposed to mythology and disjunction.  I con-
clude with a return to the questions you face atop Mount Sinai. 
I.  MYTHOLOGY AND DISJUNCTION 
All theories of constitutional interpretation take facts and pass 
them through an interpretive mechanism to discern constitutional 
meaning.  I employ the term mythology to capture misstatements of 
the facts that underlie theories of constitutional meaning.  I employ 
the term disjunction to capture inconsistencies between those facts 
and the conclusions of law advanced by a constitutional theory.  In a 
broad sense, then, mythology connotes fantastical notions about what 
I have called constitutional truth.  Disjunction, by contrast, describes 
interpretive inconsistency that arises from mythology.  As we will see, 
all theories of constitutional interpretation must develop a theory of 
the acceptability of mythology and disjunction.  Your task on Sinai is 
to develop such a theory. 
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A.  The Mythology of Law 
Few legal scholars have sought to define mythology precisely.  The 
term is often applied to both seemingly objective untruths and to 
highly contested interpretive claims.  Although scholars in other 
fields have spent considerable energy on conceptualizing myth, they 
have not advanced a uniform view.  I do not seek to present a novel 
account of the meaning of mythology, but rather to distinguish be-
tween understandings invoked elsewhere.  For our purposes, I distin-
guish between three types of myths, which I call constitutive myths, 
legal fictions, and legal myths. 
1.  Constitutive Myths 
Constitutive myths establish the collective cultural meaning of a 
social order.  In Robert Cover’s terms, constitutive myths generate 
nomoi.7  They produce normative meaning “in the history of ordinary 
legal doctrine at work in mundane affairs; in utopian and messianic 
yearnings, imaginary shapes given to a less resistant reality; in apolo-
gies for power and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled 
at the justificatory enterprises of law.”8  These myths constitute society 
through narrative.  They bind us into a collective consciousness and 
divide us into distinct communities of meaning. 
This notion of constitutive myth stretches more broadly than 
many traditional notions of myths applied to folklore.  Scholars have 
often cast myth as a narrative that generates meaning.  As Ernest Cas-
sirer writes, myth is “the art of expressing, and that means of organiz-
ing, [man’s] most deeply rooted instincts, his hopes and fears.”9  Yet 
the distinguishing feature of myth in many accounts rests in its fantas-
tical quality.  It is an illusion of the mind,10 a primordial story of a 
time before time,11 a phantasmagoria.12  Such accounts return, time 
 
 7 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term—Foreword:  Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (defining a nomos as a “normative universe” that defines what is “right 
and wrong,” “lawful and unlawful,” and “valid and void”). 
 8 Id. at 9. 
 9 ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE 48 (1946). 
 10 MAX MULLER, LECTURES ON THE SCIENCE OF LANGUAGE 21 (N.Y., Charles Scribner 1862) 
(describing mythology as “the bane of the ancient world” and a “disease of language” that 
only assumes meaning in the mind). 
 11 MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 5–6 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1963) (“Myth narrates a 
sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial Time, the fabled time of 
the ‘beginnings.’”). 
 12 CASSIRER, supra note 9, at 23 (“As these beliefs are in open contradiction to our sense-
experience and as there exist no physical objects that correspond to the mythical repre-
sentations it follows that myth is a mere phantasmagoria.”). 
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and again, to some notion of truth.  Mythology, the reasoning goes, 
departs from the truth of our objective reality.13  In so doing, it may 
either propagate dangerous falsehood or promote a transcendent 
truth. 
In the sense described here, by contrast, a constitutive myth has 
no necessary relationship with an external reality or truth.  The dis-
tinguishing feature of a constitutive myth rests in its shared signifi-
cance for a social group.  Constitutive myths, therefore, may be firmly 
rooted in fantasy or firmly rooted in reality.14  The distinction be-
tween historical narrative and constitutive myth is a blurred one.  His-
tory may be regarded as constitutive myth when it is canonized as a 
source of shared cultural meaning.  At such point, the narrative’s ba-
sis in historical reality becomes less important than the significance 
we ascribe to it.15  Of course, as historical narrative takes on this role, 
its historical roots may become more tenuous over time.  Yet fidelity 
may be just as constitutive as infidelity. 
Given that constitutive myths generate conceptions of truth, it 
may seem incongruous to place them within a typology of charges of 
misunderstanding.  As we will see, legal fictions and legal myths chal-
lenge constitutive myths against an external notion of truth.  That is, 
constitutive myths represent the challenged misunderstandings.  In a 
world unconcerned with external measures of truth, however, consti-
tutive myths represent the only relevant baseline against which to lev-
el charges of misunderstanding.  Rather than assert that a given un-
derstanding misstates truth in some fundamental sense, we would 
assert that said understanding misstates our shared system of mean-
ing.  To misunderstand would be to subscribe to constitutive mythol-
ogy not shared by the public. 
Consider a few examples of prevailing constitutive myths.  The 
most obvious relate to the Founding.  The Founding breathes life in-
to present visions of America as a social contract, a republican exper-
iment, a bastion of equality.  The same narratives flow through our 
understanding of Reconstruction and the Civil Rights Movement.  
 
 13 For a statement to this effect in legal scholarship, see Arthur S. Miller, Myth and Reality in 
American Constitutionalism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 181, 206 (1984) (reviewing DON PRICE, 
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:  SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL 
RESPONSIBILITY (1983) and HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF 
TOLERANCE:  WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CIVIL LIBERTIES (1983)). 
 14 As Rollo May writes, a “myth is a way of making sense in a senseless world.  Myths are nar-
rative patterns that give significance to our existence.”  ROLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH 
15 (1991). 
 15 Recently, Chiara Bottici has highlighted this notion among longstanding accounts of 
myth.  See CHIARA BOTTICI, A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICAL MYTH 179 (2007). 
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They also set the boundaries of the canons of admirable (and deplor-
able) sources invoked to establish meaning.16  It is not hard to chal-
lenge the historical integrity of such narratives.  Yet these narratives 
represent important pillars of our social understanding. 
2.  Legal Fictions 
Legal fictions denote socially recognized distortions of empirical 
fact employed to manipulate legal meaning.  Although the notion of 
legal fiction has a rich history in the law, scholars have struggled to 
reach a consensus as to its meaning.  They generally agree that legal 
fictions are falsehoods introduced to evade results dictated by a for-
mal notion of law.  They also generally agree that these falsehoods 
are a product of judicial creation, particularly in the common law 
mold.  The legal fiction, according to a recurrent trope, fosters the 
law’s development “like a scaffolding . . . that . . . can be removed 
with ease.”17  Falsehoods once necessary to achieve a result become 
unnecessary with the advance of the law.  Scholars disagree, however, 
on two important dimensions. 
First, they disagree as to the necessary visibility of the falsehood 
underlying a legal fiction.  For some, like Jeremy Bentham and Henry 
Maine, the legal fiction actively deludes the public in order to legiti-
mate departures from the law.18  For others, like William Blackstone, 
the legal fiction denotes an expedient falsehood that does not intend 
to deceive but may nonetheless confuse.19  For still others, like Lon 
Fuller and Roscoe Pound, the legal fiction can neither confuse nor 
 
 16 Constitutive myths define what is accepted in the canons of constitutional law, what is 
rejected in those canons, and what remains a matter of dispute.  See generally J.M. Balkin & 
Sanford Levinson, Commentary, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 
968 (1998) (discussing what ought to be “canonical in the study of law”). 
 17 LON L. FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 70 (1967). 
 18 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Preface Intended for the Second Edition of the Fragment on Government, in 
A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 509 (J.H. Burns & 
H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (defining fiction as “a wilful [sic] falsehood, having for its object 
the stealing [of] legislative power, by and for hands, which could not, or durst not, openly 
claim it,—and, but for the delusion thus produced, could not exercise it”); HENRY 
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW:  ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND 
ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 25 (N.Y., Henry Holt & Co. 1878) (defining legal fiction 
“to signify any assumption which conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law 
has undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation being modi-
fied”). 
 19 Blackstone implied that much of the power of the legal fiction lay in deception, which 
harmed a government based on popular representation.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *267–68.  He defined legal fiction as an arbitrary “expedient” more than 
an instrument of deception, however.  Id. 
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deceive.20  The notion of legal fiction, then, has alternately described 
both transparent and opaque falsehoods as well as falsehoods that 
straddle the boundary between these poles. 
Second, scholars disagree as to the type of falsehood that charac-
terizes a legal fiction.  This disagreement has been less fully explored 
in the literature.  For Bentham and Blackstone, falsehood denotes a 
recognizable departure from empirical fact.21  For Pound, by contrast, 
falsehood includes both distortions of empirical fact and distortions 
of more theoretical concepts like equity and natural law.22  These ap-
proaches rely on a transcendent notion of truth.  For Fuller, by con-
trast, the legal fiction denotes distortion of a collective notion of 
truth rather than a transcendent one:  if we all agree that a statement 
is false, then it is false for purposes of labeling it a legal fiction.23 
In the sense described here, legal fictions follow Fuller and 
Pound’s notion of transparency and Bentham and Blackstone’s no-
tion of truth.  Consider first the question of falsehood.  Given its reli-
ance on a collective notion of truth, Fuller’s notion of legal fiction 
can best be described as a genre of constitutive myth:  social meaning 
derives from our simultaneous affirmation and denial of a statement 
of truth.  I employ the notion of legal fiction to assess constitutive my-
thology against a transcendent standard:  your vision from Sinai.  For 
reasons I address in the succeeding Subpart, Sinai can only promise a 
transcendent standard of empirical fact.  Consider next the question 
of visibility.  I distinguish between recognized and unrecognized 
falsehoods.  I call the former legal fictions and the latter legal myths.  
I discuss legal myths in the next Subpart. 
This view of legal fiction has a few consequences that depart from 
conventional views.  First, legal fictions are not necessarily a product 
 
 20 See FULLER, supra note 17, at 9 (“A fiction is either (1) a statement propounded with a 
complete or partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as hav-
ing utility.”); ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (1923) (defining 
fiction as an instance when a judge claims that “a sacred or authoritative text means what 
it palpably did not mean or covers what no one had in mind when it was promulgated”). 
 21 Neither scholar made this point explicitly.  Bentham described the legal fiction as “false-
hood, the irreconcilable enemy of justice—falsehood, under the name of fiction—[that] is 
passed off by [judges] upon the deluded people” for convenience.  JEREMY BENTHAM, 
THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 92 (John 
Bowring ed., 1843).  Blackstone described legal fictions as “minute contrivances” and 
“circuities.”  BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at *268. 
 22 POUND, supra note 20, at 131 (identifying “the bolder and more general fictions of inter-
pretation, equity and natural law”). 
 23 FULLER, supra note 17, at 11–12 (“A statement must be false before it can be a fiction.  Its 
falsity depends upon whether the words used are inaccurate as an expression of reality.  
But the inaccuracy of a statement must be judged with reference to the standards of lan-
guage usage.”). 
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of judicial imagination.  They may underlie decisions concerning leg-
islative and even constitutional enactments.  Second, we may collec-
tively believe that a statement is a legal fiction even though it is not.  
That is, we may be mistaken in our belief that a statement is false. 
With these two caveats in mind, consider a few doctrines de-
scribed with reference to legal fiction.  The doctrine of sovereign 
immunity has long been identified as rooted in false claims about the 
intent of the framers of the Eleventh Amendment.24  The originalist 
justification of the incorporation of the Bill of Rights has come under 
similar assault as resting on false claims about the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.25  Each of these doctrines, of course, may be 
justified on grounds other than original intent.  Such justifications 
would render the commonly asserted legal fictions irrelevant.  Of 
course, they would also raise the possibility of a different set of legal 
fictions. 
3.  Legal Myths 
Legal myths designate unrecognized distortions of empirical fact 
that underlie legal meaning.  A legal myth is identical to a legal fic-
tion except in that it goes unnoticed.  The notion of opaque false-
hood has been more scantly theorized in legal literature than the no-
tion of transparent falsehood.  Literature on legal fictions straddles 
this divide, but the view that legal fictions must be visible is fairly 
standard.26  Scholars typically use myth as a generic term to designate 
a broad notion of misunderstanding.27  This common usage denotes 
as myth misunderstandings of truth as the speaker defines it, whether 
they be misunderstandings of empirical or theoretical claims. 
Empirical claims can be assessed definitively given adequate ob-
servational tools.  Of course, tools are seldom adequate.  What you 
are thinking right now is an empirical question, but the rest of us do 
not have a tool that can reveal it definitively.  Where you were born, 
by contrast, is a question that we can determine through historical 
 
 24 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Im-
munity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1988) (“The Eleventh Amendment . . . has long been perceived 
as a doctrinal abyss, replete with the inconsistencies borne of pragmatic adjustments to 
the principle for which it supposedly stands.”). 
 25 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 172 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 26 But see Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (2007) (describing both 
patent and latent falsehoods as legal fictions). 
 27 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704–05 (1974) 
(describing the application of the Erie doctrine to the Federal Arbitration Act). 
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records.28  It is important to note that answers to empirical questions 
like these must inhabit a broader normative context.  Consider the 
question of where you were born.  To answer this, we must know who 
you are, what it is to be in a place, what it is to be born, and so on.  In 
the abstract, these questions demand deeply theoretical answers.  
Within a normative context, however, their answers are an accepted 
element of social meaning.  Those answers are also sufficiently specif-
ic to allow us to test observations against fixed points.29 
Theoretical claims, by contrast, cannot be definitively assessed, re-
gardless of the available observational tools.  Let us distinguish be-
tween two types of theoretical claims.  First, there are claims that con-
cern imprecisely defined elements of a normative context.  Consider 
the claim that you are a just person.  Our social structure may es-
pouse a notion of what it means to be a just person, but that notion is 
not specific enough to allow us to assess definitively whether you 
meet it.  Second, there are claims that concern what a normative con-
text should look like.  Consider the claim that justice requires that all 
people have computers.  This claim is intelligible given that it occu-
pies a normative structure; otherwise, we could not communicate the 
idea of justice, the idea of computers, and so on.  The claim itself, 
however, seeks to define normative meaning rather than assess com-
pliance with it.  Each claim yields debate rather than measurement.30 
The notion of falsehood underlying legal myth—and legal fic-
tion—refers to distortions of empirical claims but not distortions of 
theoretical claims.  You arrive on Sinai as an occupant of a distinct 
normative context, that of modern American society.  Your vision il-
luminates facts within that context with tools beyond our technologi-
cal powers.  Like no other American, you see the historical record, 
 
 28 Of course, this assumes that there are reliable historical records, witnesses to the birth, 
and so on. 
 29 My aim here is not to make any deep epistemological claims about the viability of empiri-
cism as a manner of seeking truth.  Rather, I seek to capture an aspiration of our consti-
tutional discourse to nail down certain “facts” as a precondition to addressing questions 
of interpretation that cannot solely be resolved with reference to these supposed facts.  A 
recurring critique of constitutional theory charges that theorists jump to the questions 
that elude pure factual resolution without adequately engaging the empirical questions 
capable of such resolution.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998). 
 30 As these distinctions should make clear, the line between empirical claims and theoretical 
claims is more slippery than often acknowledged.  For purposes of this Article, however, 
we need not parse this boundary further.  Suffice it to say, the view from Sinai makes clear 
which views are based in empirical fact.  As we abandon the abstraction of Sinai, suffice it 
to say that within a normative context, the line between theoretical and empirical claims 
about constitutional interpretation is usually quite evident. 
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social views of morality, and the intricacies of modern practice.  The-
se empirical facts deepen the enterprise of constitutional interpreta-
tion.  The enterprise of interpretation, however, is theoretical; it is 
the task of defining normative meaning in our legal system.  If we in-
clude such theoretical disagreement within our notion of falsehood, 
legal myth—and legal fiction—will blend into the notion of constitu-
tive mythology.  To assert falsehood would be to criticize a constitu-
tive myth rather than to reveal its departure from an accepted notion 
of reality. 
For our purposes, then, a legal myth is a misstatement of fact that 
is not apparent to the speaker.  Given the absence of tools to verify 
every fact circumscribing our legal order, scholars are often at odds 
about what constitutes a legal myth.  Consider Bruce Ackerman’s 
claim that the notion that the Constitution only provides for amend-
ment through Article V is a myth.  This is a theoretical claim as to 
constitutional meaning and thus falls outside our definition of legal 
myth.  Ackerman arrives at this theoretical conclusion, however, from 
the view that scholars have misrepresented historical reality concern-
ing the Founding, Reconstruction, and New Deal.31  In our terms, 
Ackerman asserts that these scholars subscribe to legal myths.  Other 
scholars dispute Ackerman’s revisionist history; in our terms, they 
claim that he is advancing legal myths.32 
B.  Disjunction and the Law 
Scholars have devoted less energy to theorizing about disjunction 
than they have to theorizing about mythology.  Nonetheless, con-
cerns about disjunction animate all fields of academic discourse.  By 
disjunction, I mean discontinuity in the relationship between com-
ponents of a theoretical construct.33  A disjunction is present when an 
interpretive output does not follow from interpretive inputs as de-
manded by a theory of interpretation.  In legal discourse, disjunction 
denotes an instance where our conclusions of positive law fail to fol-
low from empirical fact in accordance with the requirements set out 
 
 31 See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 34–57 (1991) (describing his 
constitutional theory as a rejection of the “Bicentennial Myth”). 
 32 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 
115, 115–16 (1994) (challenging Ackerman’s theory as rooted in a myth about the period 
between the end of Reconstruction and Brown v. Bd. of Educ.). 
 33 Scholars have used this term loosely to designate a disconnection or incongruity.  See, e.g., 
PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW:  MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
MIND 9–12 (1996).  Here, I wish to use it in a more particularized way about the internal 
logic of a constitutional theory. 
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by a theory of interpretation.  We most often speak about three types 
of disjunction in constitutional theory:  those between law and histo-
ry, law and morality, and law and practice. 
1.  Law and History 
Historical inquiry rests at the core of an order built on the notion 
of a founding document.  To discern the meaning of that document, 
we delve into historical moments that circumscribe it.  History serves 
as a guide for how to treat history:  interpretations of the Founding 
inform views of how to treat the historical moments that succeed it.  
Your vision on Sinai illuminates these historical moments, but it can-
not tell you how they relate to one another to generate constitutional 
meaning.  That is the task that confronts the constitutional theorist.  
She must elucidate an interpretive framework that explains how his-
torical occurrences shape legal meaning, if they do at all.  Constitu-
tional interpretation, then, requires a theory that relates history to 
law. 
Disjunctions between law and history denote instances where that 
theory breaks down.  A theory of legal interpretation, of course, may 
allow for departures between law and history.  Such departures do 
not represent disjunctions.  Rather, they represent conjunctions:  the 
theory allows the departure according to its internal metrics relating 
history to law.  A disjunction occurs when we fail to construe substan-
tive legal meaning in accordance with those metrics.  That is, disjunc-
tion occurs when our vision of the substantive law is not faithful to ei-
ther the relevant historical record or the law’s interpretive guidelines.  
Either we misapply the proper interpretive methodology, or we 
properly apply that methodology to an inaccurate account of history. 
A theory of interpretation could render disjunctions between law 
and history impossible.  If you believed law were a composite of histo-
ry, the range of possible disjunctions would be a null set:  there would 
be no way law could depart from history.  It is difficult to imagine 
such a regime, however.  You might believe that the law is a code 
adopted at a particular moment to apply to eternity, but presumably 
such a code could be misapplied.34  Alternatively, if you believed that 
history was irrelevant to interpretation, it would make no sense to 
speak of a disjunction between law and history.  This regime may 
seem more plausible than the previous one; perhaps the legal order 
 
 34 For example, we might say that a code adopted on Day Zero contains all relevant legal 
rules and that those rules prohibit alteration and all non-formalist interpretation. 
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could address every issue de novo.  The very notion of constitutional-
ism, however, presumes some condition precedent based in history.35 
Accordingly, most, if not all, interpretive theories treat history as 
instructive but not dispositive.  History is relevant for law but law is 
not history.  Even the most ardent textualists look to historical usage 
apart from the text itself, and even the most ardent anti-textualists in-
voke historical practice to advance apparent departures from text.36  
The most ardent originalists acknowledge that law flows from history 
through interpretation; no component of history is equivalent to 
law.37  The difficulty rests in synthesizing different historical elements 
and moments in history to reach a legitimate legal outcome.  It 
should not be difficult to see the potential for disjunction that follows 
from this task.  Disjunction may appear in the open as we examine 
history and the law.  Or, it may hide beneath misunderstandings of 
facts relevant to interpretation. 
Assertions of disjunction between law and history abound in con-
stitutional discourse.  Consider, for example, debates about the 
Court’s construction of substantive due process.  In Roe v. Wade, the 
majority asserted that the Due Process Clause protects rights that are 
“fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”38  The 
Court has not settled definitively on this standard, or any of its com-
petitors.39  In dissent, however, Justice Rehnquist did not quibble with 
 
 35 This is, of course, contestable.  The natural rights theorist might posit that certain rights 
are innate, and that the passage of time has no relation to their authority or legitimacy.  
For most theorists, however, time is a vital concern.  As Jed Rubenfeld argues, “[s]elf-
government is achieved by committing oneself to certain ends and holding oneself to 
those commitments over time.  Human freedom is the freedom to write:  to give one’s life 
a text.”  Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1145 (1995). 
 36 For the textualist view, consider, for example, Justice Black’s famous analysis of the Bill of 
Rights.  Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865 (1960).  Black defended 
his view that there are absolutes in the Bill of Rights not by mere invocation of text; he in-
voked “[t]he whole history and background of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as I 
understand it.”  Id. at 867.  For the anti-textualist view, consider, for example, Jack Bal-
kin’s critique of Raoul Berger’s originalist views.  Balkin argued that “we have rejected 
Berger’s history because we know that the meaning of the Constitution is essentially his-
torical—that it is a meaning which works itself out through history.”  J.M. Balkin, Constitu-
tional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 953–54 (1988) (review-
ing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM:  THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)). 
 37 Consider once more Justice Black’s argument that there are absolutes in the Bill of 
Rights, given history and text “as I understand it.”  Black, supra note 36, at 867.  Although 
originalists like Black sought to cabin judicial discretion in the act of interpretation, they 
do not claim to fully eliminate that discretion. 
 38 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937)). 
 39 The Court has also looked to the “penumbra” of the Constitution, Griswold v. Connecti-
cut., 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), whether a right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
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the majority’s standard.  Rather, he asserted that the majority had dis-
torted history and thereby misapplied the requirements of its stand-
ard.40  In so doing, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the majority ad-
vanced a disjunction between law and history. 
2.  Law and Morality 
It is more controversial to assert that constitutional interpretation 
contains a moral component.  For some constitutional theorists, the 
interpretive project is wholly historical.  The originalist declares that 
it is illegitimate to look beyond original intent.  The living constitu-
tionalist may speak in similar tones.  The Constitution, she might say, 
represents a living document precisely because it was so envisioned by 
the Framers.  Jack Balkin’s view of originalist living constitutionalism 
ties these two strands in this fashion.41  So does Bruce Ackerman’s 
theory of dualist democracy; the legitimacy of extra-textual amend-
ment, says Ackerman, derives from the Founding view of revolution-
ary constitutionalism.42  Morality, for such views, is a consideration for 
the political branches. 
Led of late by Ronald Dworkin, scholars have contested the no-
tion that morality has no role in constitutional interpretation.43  
Dworkin places moral judgments at the core of the judicial task.  This 
does not mean that judges may read their own moral convictions into 
the document.  Rather, Dworkin argues that judges “must regard 
themselves as partners with other officials, past and future, who to-
gether elaborate a coherent constitutional morality.”44  For Dworkin, 
the task of constitutional interpretation involves two steps.  First, the 
interpreter must devise each possible constitutional theory that justi-
 
and tradition,” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)), and international consensus, Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (viewing international law as instructive in combi-
nation with the standard identified in Glucksberg). 
 40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 174–77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 41 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 549 (2009) (“Original meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are compat-
ible positions.  In fact, they are two sides of the same coin.”). 
 42 See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 165–67 (explaining that for the Founders, the “consti-
tutional text inaugurates the American experiment in dualism by defining a higher law-
making process through which future generations might concentrate their political ener-
gies to make fundamental law in the name of We the People of the United States”). 
 43 For a pair of other prominent, recent critiques of the notion that morality has no role to 
play in interpretation, see generally JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 10, 
30 (1980) and DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 23–31 (1977). 
 44 RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW:  THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 10 (1996). 
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fies the settled principles of the prevailing constitutional scheme as a 
whole.45  Second, the interpreter must “judge which of these eligible 
readings makes the work in progress best, all things considered.”46  
The latter judgment must invoke morality, albeit subject to the con-
straints imposed by the political history of the community.47 
So stated, Dworkin’s theory depends on a notion of morality that 
could not be characterized as definitively false.  Moral claims are 
hardly empirical; they are theoretical in the sense that they either (1) 
invoke an imprecisely defined element of our normative structure, or 
(2) call into question the proper contours of that structure.  As 
Dworkin defines the role of morality in interpretation, however, mor-
al claims must be consistent with a specific standard:  the moral views 
of the constitutional community.  Of course, the normative meaning 
of collective intent is not sufficiently defined to allow us to test it 
without additional theory.  Once we define this concept, however, its 
evaluation begins to look empirical.  Suppose a theory stipulates that 
collective intent only exists when a majority of citizens hold the belief 
in question.  With appropriate tools, this is a testable proposition that 
would exclude many visions of morality. 
It follows that invocations of morality may fall outside verifiable 
boundaries set by a theory of constitutional interpretation.  When 
such invocations of morality influence legal conclusions, there is a 
disjunction between law and morality from the view of that interpre-
tive theory.  Disjunctions between law and morality denote instances 
in which a vision of positive law does not follow from an interpretive 
theory’s guidelines governing morality.  Either an interpreter does 
not follow the theory’s requirements relating law and morality, or she 
does not adhere to a vision of morality within the dictates of the the-
ory.  Legal fictions and legal myths may encourage impermissible 
views of morality.  An interpreter might advance a moral view outside 
the range of moral views allowed by a theory if she mischaracterizes 
the facts that define that range. 
Of course, some theories of constitutional interpretation render 
the notion of disjunction between law and morality unintelligible.  
Strict positivist accounts present law as an operational system apart 
 
 45 Id. at 10–11 (arguing that judges may not read their own convictions into the Constitu-
tion “unless they find it consistent in principle with the structural design of the Constitu-
tion as a whole, and also with the dominant lines of past constitutional interpretation by 
other judges”). 
 46 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 231 (1986). 
 47 Id. at 255 (“[A]nyone who accepts law as integrity must accept that the actual political 
history of his community will sometimes check his other political convictions in his over-
all interpretive judgment.”). 
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from moral values.48  Strict natural-law theory denies that an immoral 
requirement may be law.49  Yet most accounts treat morality as rele-
vant to our construction of law but not equivalent to law itself.  
Originalists seek to avoid moral questions through historical fidelity, 
but their efforts often cloak moral judgments.50  Fundamental-rights 
theorists draw on the themes of natural-law theory, but they do not 
extend those themes to challenge enumerated constitutional provi-
sions.51  More typically, theorists have accounted for value judgments 
that cannot be resolved without reference to morality.  Like Dworkin, 
they have devised theories that cabin those judgments, whether by 
neutral principles,52 passive virtues,53 republican dialogue,54 or some-
thing else. 
Speakers in constitutional discourse frequently allege disjunction 
between law and morality.  Contentious cases elicit assertions that the 
judges either misapplied or misconstrued moral principles.  Consider 
Herbert Wechsler’s critique of Brown v. Board of Education.  Although 
Wechsler agreed with the result, he argued that the Court’s decision 
could not find support in neutral principles applicable across the law; 
 
 48 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED, at vi-viii (London, 
John Murray 1832). 
 49 See generally A.P. D’ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 115 (1951) (arguing that “law is a part of eth-
ics”). 
 50 For a clear articulation of this view, see David A. Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 
22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 301 (2005) (arguing that moral judgments inevitably enter an 
orignalist’s interpretations, and that given the originalist creed, these judgments are cov-
ert).  Even Justice Scalia, the most prominent advocate of originalism, has acknowledged 
this possibility.  See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 
(1989) (“The inevitable tendency of judges to think that the law is what they would like it 
to be will, I have no doubt, cause most errors in judicial historiography to be made in the 
direction of projecting upon the age of 1789 current, modern values—so that as applied, 
even as applied in the best of faith, originalism will (as the historical record shows) end 
up as something of a compromise.”). 
 51 See, e.g., Lloyd Weinreb’s critique of the natural law analysis of the Constitution advanced 
by David Richards in RICHARDS, supra note 43.  As Weinreb argues, Richards relies on the 
Constitution “to establish the validity of the moral principles he applies.”  LLOYD L. 
WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 116 (1987).  Richards “has difficulty getting past 
what he regards as incorrectly limited moral notions contained in the Constitution—
which, after all, accepted the institution of slavery,” Weinreb argues, and ultimately his 
analysis “remains an analysis of the legal order according to its own premises, which are 
validated only within the legal order itself.”  Id. at 117. 
 52 See generally Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
 53 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:  THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). 
 54 See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword:  Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986). 
1390 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:5 
 
that is, the court misapplied its interpretive guidelines.55  Of course, 
many other writers have defended Brown with a similar view of moral-
ity but a different vision of the proper role of morality in legal inter-
pretation.  For Dworkin, the decision does not represent a disjunc-
tion between law and morality; rather, it reverses a status quo built on 
an impermissible conception of morality given the development of 
social views after Plessy v. Ferguson.56 
3.  Law and Practice 
Practice, like morality, has a somewhat controversial place in con-
stitutional interpretation.  Once again, the originalist will deny that 
present practice can legitimately enter into what should be a purely 
historical inquiry.  Let us postpone the response to the originalist to 
be clear about what disjunction between law and practice is not.  
Scholars often identify a difference between “law in books” and “law 
in action.”57  This difference speaks to the distance between impera-
tive and conjunctive; that is, the law is not adequately enforced in 
practice.  Surely, this departure between law and practice represents a 
contradiction in every sense of the word.  It does not, however, repre-
sent a disjunction of the type with which I am concerned. 
For our purposes, a disjunction between law and practice denotes 
an instance when conclusions of law do not follow from practice in 
accordance with the dictates of a constitutional theory.  Social and 
legislative practice informs legal meaning for most theories of consti-
tutional interpretation.  Lawrence Lessig’s linguistic analysis of fideli-
ty in translation conveys this point in particularly vivid terms.58  As 
Lessig argues, reading constitutional text inevitably takes place within 
a social context.  Lessig criticizes the notion that we may achieve fi-
delity to that text merely by determining its meaning within the con-
text of its authors.  Fidelity to any text, he argues, requires translating 
the meaning within the context of the authors into the context in-
habited by the readers.  This process requires not only an under-
standing of history, but also an understanding of the present.59 
 
 55 Wechsler, supra note 52, at 31–35. 
 56 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE supra note 46, at 387–88. 
 57 For a classic statement of this dichotomy, see Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Ac-
tion, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 22 (1910). 
 58 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1993). 
 59 As Lessig puts the point, “[i]f context matters to meaning, and if contexts may change, 
then the reader focused on fidelity needs a way to neutralize or accommodate the effect that 
changing context may have on meaning.  Fidelity, that is, needs a way of reading that pre-
serves meaning despite changes in context.”  Id. at 1177. 
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Lessig’s argument is well known, and there is no need to rehash it 
here.  His point is perhaps most clear in its application to the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual” punishment.  To 
interpret this provision, we might look to what the Framers consid-
ered to be cruel and unusual at the time of the Founding.  This, Les-
sig argues, would be to pronounce fidelity to the Founding context 
rather than the Founding meaning.  The fidelity Lessig envisions, by 
contrast, would call upon modern interpreters to translate this pro-
hibition into the modern context.  Whereas the Framers may have 
viewed flogging as a permissible punishment within the Clause, mod-
ern notions of what constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment do 
not.  By discerning how the Framers understood the provision within 
their social context, we may discern an equivalent meaning within 
ours.60 
In theory, an interpretive approach could render comparisons be-
tween law and practice unintelligible.  We might arrive at the view 
that practice has no necessary relationship with law.  Lessig defines 
this view as one-step fidelity.61  If this were the case, there could not 
be a relevant disjunction between these unrelated elements.  Or, we 
might arrive at the view that law simply is practice.  This view would 
eliminate the possibility of a departure between elements that are 
one and the same thing.  Neither of these views is very plausible, 
however.  As Lessig argues, even self-proclaimed one-step fidelitists 
like Justice Scalia accept the notion of translation when it comes to 
transparently contextual terms like “cruel and unusual” punish-
ment.62  To equate practice with law, moreover, would be to deny the 
constitutional project altogether; we would not be bound by history, 
morality, or any other force that transcends the present. 
Most interpretive approaches openly accept the notion that prac-
tice influences legal meaning.  Lessig’s criticism centers on the failure 
of some theorists to discern the importance of translation for consti-
tutional provisions built on words less obviously normative than “cru-
el and unusual.”63  Translation reflects the primary project of living 
constitutionalism in its various forms.  The notion of living constitu-
tionalism highlights an important quality of disjunctions between law 
and practice:  as practice changes, so will the dictates of conjunction 
 
 60 Id. at 1185–88. 
 61 Id. at 1183–84. 
 62 Id. at 1187. 
 63 Indeed, it is more often the normative assumptions that circumscribe the words that 
change, rather than the particular content of the words themselves.  Consider, for exam-
ple, Lessig’s discussion of the meaning of Article V.  See id. at 1220–24. 
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between law and practice.64  Accordingly, a conjunction may trans-
form into disjunction and a disjunction may transform into conjunc-
tion.  To the extent that social views of morality change over time as 
well, disjunctions between law and morality will exhibit similar pat-
terns. 
II.  THE ENLIGHTENMENT IDEAL 
As you descend from Sinai, it will be difficult to ignore the path 
advised by a chorus of voices that echoes across our constitutional 
landscape.  This is the path of the Enlightenment ideal.  The En-
lightenment ideal dictates three foundational principles for constitu-
tional theorists.  First, it demands a broad and deep inquiry into 
sources of social meaning.  Second, it demands that theories of social 
meaning rest on assertions of fact rather than fiction.  Third, it de-
mands that theories of social meaning consistently and uniformly ad-
here to their own tenets.  From these three principles, a fairly 
straightforward conclusion follows:  when you return from Sinai, you 
should spare no effort to eliminate the mythology and disjunctions 
that you encounter. 
A.  The Founding and Enlightenment 
Scholarship on the Enlightenment origins of the Constitution has 
fallen out of vogue.  Where earlier debates assessed the influence of 
European Enlightenment in the Colonies, contemporary ones delve 
into the more uniquely American qualities of intellectual movements 
in the Revolutionary period.65  Nonetheless, a dominant constitutive 
myth of American constitutionalism continues to link the Framers 
with the Enlightenment.66  For modern scholars, as for Enlighten-
ment thinkers, a definition of Enlightenment has remained elusive.  I 
have no illusions about providing clarity in this area.  Rather, I identi-
fy a particular disposition characteristic of Enlightenment thought. 
 
 64 Of course, these shifts must be harmonized with a theory’s understanding of the relation-
ship between law and history as well as law and morality.  Shifts in the legal and non-legal 
presuppositions that underlie interpretation inform how we construct both the content 
and importance of history and morality relevant to interpretation. 
 65 Colin Bonwick, Enlightenment and Experience:  The Virginia Constitution of 1776, in AMERICA 
AND ENLIGHTENMENT CONSTITUTIONALISM 177 (Gary L. McDowell & Johnathan O’Neill 
eds., 2006). 
 66 Scholars often invoke the Enlightenment to categorize the Founding.  See, e.g., AKHIL 
REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION:  A BIOGRAPHY 243 (2005) (noting in passing that a 
“general commitment to Enlightenment values (slavery aside) pulsated through the Con-
stitution”). 
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It is no surprise that Enlightenment remains a prominent motif in 
scholarship about the Founding.  As Bernard Bailyn writes, leading 
Enlightenment thinkers “were quoted everywhere in the colonies, by 
everyone who claimed a broad awareness.”67  The “pervasiveness of 
such citations,” Bailyn notes, “is at times astonishing.”68  Writers re-
ferred to Americans as “an enlightened people.”69  Prominent revolu-
tionary thinkers joined the pantheon of luminaries of the European 
Enlightenment.70  For Bailyn, however, the colonists portrayed 
knowledge of Enlightenment that tended toward the superficial.  
More than an Enlightenment program, colonists conveyed awe of En-
lightenment.71 
A better understanding of the European Enlightenment would 
not necessarily have yielded a more precise Enlightenment program 
in the Colonies.  Enlightenment is simply a label retroactively applied 
to a set of intellectual perspectives.72  We associate enlightenment 
with the advance of reason at the expense of tradition and culture.  
To recycle a few recurrent tropes, Enlightenment thinkers engaged 
in a “struggle of light against darkness,”73 “transforming the invisible 
into the visible, the ineffable into the discursive, and the unknown in-
to the known.”74  Some obvious questions arise.  What is reason?  Why 
did it oppose tradition and culture?  What lay in light and in dark-
ness?  On this, Enlightenment thinkers were not of a uniform view. 
At a sufficiently high level of generality, however, some patterns 
emerge.  Consider Kant’s famous dictum, “Enlightenment is mankind’s 
exit from its self-incurred immaturity.”75  What is immaturity?  For Kant, it 
is “the inability to make use of one’s own understanding without the 
 
 67 BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 (1967). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 5 (1969) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 For a survey of these contributions, see ROBERT A. FERGUSON, THE AMERICAN 
ENLIGHTENMENT 1750–1820 (1997). 
 71 BAILYN, supra note 67, at 28. 
 72 Accordingly, there are many debates about to whom it should be applied and how the 
term should be qualified for different strands of thought, including in relation to the 
Framers.  See, e.g., Harold J. Berman, The Impact of the Enlightenment on American Constitu-
tional Law, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 311–13 (1992) (discussing confusion wrought by us-
ing the term “enlightenment” to describe thought emerging from the French Revolution 
and the English Revolution). 
 73 FERGUSON, supra note 70, at 25. 
 74 STEPHEN ERIC BRONNER, RECLAIMING THE ENLIGHTENMENT:  TOWARD A POLITICS OF 
RADICAL ENGAGEMENT 19 (2004). 
 75 Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question:  What is Enlightenment?, in WHAT IS 
ENLIGHTENMENT?  EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY QUESTIONS 
58, 58 (James Schmidt ed., 1996). 
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guidance of another.”76  We must, he writes, “have the courage to use 
[our] own understanding.”77  How do we reach said understanding?  
We must aspire to thought unimpeded by “[r]ules and formulas, the-
se mechanical instruments of a rational use (or rather misuse) of 
[our] natural gifts.”78  Why employ those natural gifts?  For Kant, 
“[o]ne age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place a succeed-
ing one in a condition whereby it would be impossible for the latter 
age to broaden its knowledge (particularly such pressing knowledge), 
to cleanse itself of errors[.]”79  Kant hardly spoke for all Enlighten-
ment thinkers, but this provides a start. 
Enlightenment rhetoric elevated notions of breadth, fact, and co-
herence.  Like Kant, Enlightenment thinkers called for a return to 
first principles.  In the pursuit of truth, no rock should remain un-
turned, no bridge untested, and no prior claim blindly trusted.80  
They were not quite willing, however, to abstain from privileging a 
few principles above others.  Inquiries into truth were to decry factual 
error of any kind.  Truth had to exhibit some consistent logic; it 
could not rest on contradiction.  The Enlightenment thinker was to 
inquire broadly into the sources of truth but within the confines of 
fact and logic.  Of course, the details of this inquiry were a matter of 
debate, as were the conclusions different inquiries demanded.  The 
Framers responded more to some Enlightenment thinkers than oth-
ers; indeed, it appears that they had little knowledge of Kant.81 
Ernest Gellner conveys this orthodoxy with particular clarity.  For 
Gellner, reason denoted “the notion of a single, systematic, orderly 
method of the attainment of truth, incarnate in all and privileged in 
none.”82  This notion was at once “generic” and “transcendent.”83  
Reason is generic in the sense that it requires “general considera-
 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 59. 
 79 Id. at 61. 
 80 Descartes is particularly emblematic on this point.  As he put it, “as regards the opinions 
to which I had until now given credence, I could not do better than to try to get rid of 
them once and for all, in order to replace them later on, either with other ones that are 
better, or even with the same ones once I had reconciled them to the norms of reason.”  
RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 8 
(Donald A. Cress trans., Hackett Publishing Co., 4th ed. 1998). 
 81 See Mark V. Tushnet, Sex, Drugs, and Rock ‘n’ Roll:  Some Conservative Reflections on Liberal 
Jurisprudence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534 (1982) (book review) (arguing that while the 
Framers “knew what Milton and Locke had said . . . they were largely ignorant of the con-
temporaneous writings of Kant”). 
 82 ERNEST GELLNER, REASON AND CULTURE:  THE HISTORIC ROLE OF RATIONALITY AND 
RATIONALISM 178 (1992). 
 83 Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted). 
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tions” and must be both “tidy and systematic:  what [reason] does, fits 
into a wider order.”84  Reason is transcendent in the sense that “[t]he 
criteria she deploys, the truths she attained, are not tied to the organ-
ism, social or other, within which she happens to be functioning.”85  
In this sense, Enlightenment reason harbors an irresolvable conflict.  
Just as reason rejects orthodoxy governing thought, it advances an or-
thodoxy of its own:  “[t]he notion of the exclusive, jealous and order-
ly deity, which had helped engender rational unificatory thought, it-
self in the end also sinned against it.”86 
Given these tensions, some scholars have sought to abandon the 
idea of Enlightenment reason altogether.  Building on the work of 
Margaret Jacob,87 James Q. Whitman distinguishes between reason 
and hermeticism.  Whitman writes: 
“Hermeticism” is reasoning—but it is reasoning that starts from a critical 
assumption:  the assumption that there is a key to the universe.  A person 
engaging in hermetic reasoning believes that the process of reason 
(whether inductive or deductive) will reveal some relatively simple prin-
ciple or relatively coherent scheme that explains how the world works; 
ideally something with the simplicity and evident grandeur (to take the 
model most popular in [the] eighteenth century) of Newtonian gravity.  
It hardly needs to be emphasized that this assumption is neither required 
nor justified by the concept of “reason” itself.88 
For Whitman, hermeticism better describes many of the popular as-
pects of Enlightenment thought.  These aspects, he argues, inherited 
the Ramist tradition of logic and contributed to the allure of Enlight-
enment movements like freemasonry.89 
Consistent with Enlightenment rhetoric, Founding rhetoric em-
phasized breadth of inquiry, factual grounding, and structural coher-
ence.  Consider Hamilton’s descriptions of the Constitution in Feder-
alist No. 9.  According to Hamilton, “[i]f it had been found 
impracticable, to have devised models of a more perfect structure, 
the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to aban-
don the cause of that species of government as indefensible.  The sci-
ence of politics, however, like most other sciences has received great 
 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 72. 
 86 Id. at 178. 
 87 See generally MARGARET C. JACOB, LIVING THE ENLIGHTENMENT:  FREEMASONRY AND 
POLITICS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (1991); MARGARET C. JACOB, THE RADICAL 
ENLIGHTENMENT:  PANTHEISTS, FREEMASONS AND REPUBLICANS (1981). 
 88 James Q. Whitman, Reason or Hermeticism?:  A Comment, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 193, 198 
(1997). 
 89 Id. at 199–200. 
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improvement.”90  Through the separation of powers, checks and bal-
ances, an independent judiciary, and popular representation, Hamil-
ton posited that “the excellencies of republican government may be 
retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.”91  This combina-
tion of “new discoveries” and revived notions that had “made their 
principal progress towards perfection in modern times” promised a 
system beyond improvement.92 
Hamilton’s claims may seem naïve or propagandistic.  Nonethe-
less, they capture a central element of the Founding project.  As Gor-
don Wood puts it in his classic account, the Framers “sought to un-
derstand politics, as [they] had all of life, by capturing in an integrat-
integrated, ordered, changeless ideal the totality and complexity of 
the world.”93  In the first years of the republic, the Newtonian meta-
phor became common in descriptions of the Constitution.94  As 
Whitman writes, the Founding notion of constitutionalism derived 
from “the idea of the ‘natural’ constitution of the human body, an 
idea ultimately borrowed from the alien world of Hippocratic medi-
cine.”95  To build a constitution required scientific inquiry into the 
truth of our political nature. 
The Founding concern with breadth, fact, and coherence did not 
dictate a particular approach to constitutionalism.  Henry F. May’s 
account of Enlightenment in America is instructive in this regard.  
May identifies four Enlightenment movements:  Moderate Enlight-
enment, Skeptical Enlightenment, Revolutionary Enlightenment, and 
Didactic Enlightenment.96  As their names suggest, these movements 
reached different conclusions as to how to best fashion political order 
according to reason.  The Moderate Enlightenment defended bal-
ance and compromise akin to the English system, whereas the Skepti-
cal Enlightenment favored absolutism of the type propounded by the 
French philosophes.  The Revolutionary Enlightenment counseled 
radical breaks with past culture, whereas the Didactic Enlightenment 
favored incremental change and defended intellectual culture.  Of 
course, these divisions oversimplify matters.  They convey, however, 
the many Enlightenment paths open to the Framers. 
 
 90 THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, at 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 WOOD, supra note 69, at 606. 
 94 See generally MICHAEL FOLEY, LAWS, MEN AND MACHINES:  MODERN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT AND THE APPEAL OF NEWTONIAN MECHANICS 3–4 (1990). 
 95 Whitman, supra note 88, at 199. 
 96 See HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA, at xvi (1976). 
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May convincingly identifies the Framers with the Moderate En-
lightenment and the Didactic Enlightenment.  In a much-quoted pas-
sage of Federalist No. 14, Madison notes that although the people 
“have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other 
nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity, for 
custom, or for names.”97  The basic contours of the new constitutional 
order, however, followed colonial government and the English sys-
tem.98  The Framers devised a constitutional scheme to address con-
cerns that “[e]nlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm”99 
and that “[t]he reason of man, like man himself is timid and cau-
tious, when left alone.”100  That scheme did not veer into the more 
radical currents that would envelop France.  This is not to say, how-
ever, that a more radical path would have been inconsistent with rea-
son.  Rather, it is to say that they reasoned to a different conclusion 
about the dictates of reason.101 
That conclusion, to borrow a construct from Paul Kahn, sought to 
unify scientific reason with popular will.  For the Framers, Kahn ar-
gues, scientific government would be illegitimate without consent, 
and popular government would be bad government without science.  
Accordingly, the goal of the Founding project was “to achieve popu-
lar legitimation of an objectively true political order, to found popu-
lar choice on popular, though still genuine, wisdom.”102  Its success is 
open to interpretation, as is the question of what we should do when 
reason and will diverge.  For Kahn, reason could not triumph over 
will; the Framers could not impose the true path upon the public, at 
least not with a clear conscience.  For other theorists, reason must 
triumph over will; it is reason—not will—that legitimates a constitu-
tional order.103  Such debate highlights once again the range of possi-
ble structures dictated by our three tenets of Enlightenment. 
This is not to say that the Founding story can only be told with 
reference to the Enlightenment.  We often tell a different story:  that 
the Constitution was born of a series of compromises.104  This story 
 
 97 THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 88 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 98 This argument has been most prominently advanced in WOOD, supra note 69. 
 99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
100 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 340 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
101 See MAY, supra note 96, at 360 (discussing the influence of the Revolutionary Enlighten-
ment on American thought). 
102 PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY:  SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 17 (1992). 
103 This is, for example, the approach of the German Constitution. 
104 For a recent articulation of this view, see John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the 
Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 428–32 (2010). 
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highlights the politics necessary to bring together disparate factions.  
At its most extreme, it casts the Constitution as a product of self-
interested politics of power.105  I do not intend to disparage this ac-
count.  Surely, there are elements of truth in it, although it is clear 
that Charles Beard overstated his case.106  This view merely represents 
another strand running through our constitutional discourse; it does 
not alter the echoes of Enlightenment rhetoric that reverberate from 
the Founding period.  As we will see, this view of the Constitution as 
born of compromise is harmonious with another organizing force 
within our constitutional system:  the common law culture. 
The key here is that the Framers spoke of their constitutional pro-
ject as a product of breadth, fact, and coherence.  Even if the new 
structure did not mark a transcendent break with past practice or fol-
low an Enlightenment notion of principle, its proponents paid obei-
sance to enlightenment.  The Framers looked to the nature of gov-
ernment, the nature of the American people, the nature of human 
ordering, and so on, seeking genuine understanding.  They proposed 
an order that derived from those understandings and promised a 
Newtonian coherence.  We might say that they failed.  This should 
not, however, obscure the Founding rhetoric.  That rhetoric would 
outlast the Founding, giving rise to dual concerns with constitutional 
rediscovery and constitutional perfection. 
B.  Interpretation and Enlightenment 
By most metrics, the act of framing a constitutional order is quite 
different from the act of interpreting one.  The former devises a sys-
tem of government, whereas the latter construes the meaning of such 
a system.  From the perspective of the Enlightenment ideal, however, 
these acts are of the same ilk.  Recall the Hippocratic notion that 
each human body has a natural constitution.  For the Enlightenment 
ideal, both the framer of a new constitutional order and the inter-
preter of an existing constitutional order are to discern the dictates 
of the constitution of the relevant political body.  Both the framer 
and the interpreter construe the same transcendent truth.  The dif-
 
105 For perhaps the most prominent example, see CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC 
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 324 (1941) (arguing that 
movement for the Constitution was first made by “a small and active group of men imme-
diately interested through their personal possessions in the outcome of their labors.”). 
106 For a classic critique, see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 
167–348 (1968). 
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ference between them lies in time; the interpreter confronts a politi-
cal body shaped by the framer. 
Like the Framers, we speak of uncovering the dictates of our na-
tional constitution, which is to say the dictates of the composition of 
our collective political body.  Like the Framers, we speak of that en-
terprise with reference to three tenets of Enlightenment:  first princi-
ples, factual accuracy, and structural coherence.  Unlike the Framers, 
however, we confront a political body with a tangible touchstone:  the 
written Constitution.  That text occupies the focal point of inquiries 
into the principles that animate our political order as well as inquiries 
into the principles that might animate our political order with re-
form.  We invoke the language of Enlightenment both to uncover 
our constitution and to transform it. 
Begin with the Marshall Court.  Comprised of members of the 
Founding generation, the Court invoked the spirit of Enlightenment 
in order to reach results that at times sound as much of creation as 
interpretation.  Consider the Court’s most studied cases, Marbury v. 
Madison107 and McCulloch v. Maryland.108  In each, Chief Justice Mar-
shall engages in a broad inquiry into the first principles animating 
the substance and legitimacy of the Constitution.  He turns to a close 
reading of the text and an unyielding commitment to constitutional 
coherence.  The demands of the coherent constitutional structure 
ratified by the people, Marshall claims, dictates each result.109  We 
may contest this claim; indeed, many scholars have.110  Yet, even if im-
perfectly or unfaithfully, the Court purported to reason to the dic-
tates of our political constitution in accordance with the Enlighten-
ment ideal. 
With the passing of the Founding generation, courts and com-
mentators abandoned anything resembling creation, embracing 
more distant notions of interpretation.  When Abraham Lincoln de-
livered his Lyceum Address in 1838, he lamented that the Founding 
generation and its “pillars of the temple of liberty” had “crumbled 
 
107 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
108 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
109 See KAHN, supra note 102, at 24–31 (describing Marshall’s reasoning in Marbury and 
McCulloch as applied political science). 
110 Scholars have been more critical of Marbury than McCulloch.  For some prominent cri-
tiques of Marbury, see BICKEL, supra note 53, at 15–23; LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS 56–77 (1958); and James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).  For a recent critique of McCul-
loch, see generally Kurt T. Lash, The Original Meaning of an Omission:  The Tenth Amendment, 
Popular Sovereignty, and “Expressly” Delegated Power, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1889 (2008). 
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away.”111  Without those pillars, he warned, the “temple must fall, un-
less we, their descendents, supply their places with other pillars, hewn 
from the solid quarry of sober reason.”112  Lincoln’s prescription?  
“Reason, cold, calculating, unimpassioned reason,” which would 
“furnish all the materials for our future support and defense.”113  
Modern generations needed to mold those materials into “general in-
telligence, sound morality, and in particular, a reverence for the constitution 
and laws.”114  In so doing, they would prevent the tyranny and un-
reason guarded against by the framers and in much the same fashion. 
Reverence may sound of a departure from the Enlightenment 
ideal, but it need not.  Paul Kahn distinguishes between the notion of 
applied science advanced by the Founding generation and the notion 
of constitutional maintenance that emerged with Lincoln and think-
ers like Joseph Story and John C. Calhoun.  Whereas members of the 
Founding generation reasoned to a new constitutional order, Kahn 
argues, their immediate successors hoped merely to “maintain the ed-
ifice made by the founders.”115  Framed thusly, the effort to maintain 
the Constitution echoes the Founding inquiry, even if not its particu-
lar conclusions.  Like the Framers, Story and Calhoun embarked up-
on a searching inquiry into the dictates of our national constitution.  
For them, that constitution rested in the Founding pact devised by 
the Framers.  They spoke of the fundamental principles of our consti-
tutional order and amendments that would perfect it.116  As John Nor-
ton Pomeroy wrote in 1868, “[o]ur fathers, by an almost divine pres-
cience, struck the golden mean” in devising our political system.117  
We were to reason to the “truth of history.”118 
 
111 Abraham Lincoln, The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions:  Address Before the 
Young Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:  HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 76, 84 (Roy P. Basler ed., 2001). 
112 Id. at 84. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 84–85. 
115 KAHN, supra note 102, at 35. 
116 See JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT AND A DISCOURSE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 12, 112 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 
Charleston, S.C., Walker & James  1851) (invoking the “great principle” of the “responsi-
bility of the rulers to the ruled” and the “fundamental principle” that “the people are the 
source of all power”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 338 (Boston, Hillard, Gray & Co. 1833) (arguing that the Constitution 
“is, and accordingly has always been, treated as a fundamental law, and not as a mere con-
tract of government, during the good pleasure of all the persons, who were originally 
bound by it, or assented to it”). 
117 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 156 (Bos., Houghton, Osgood & Co., 4th ed. 1879). 
118 Id. at § 152. 
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The substitution of Darwin for Newton shifted visions of the 
meaning of the Founding, but not the rhetoric accompanying their 
justification.  Invocations of first principles remained; the principles 
invoked, however, called on a Darwinian notion of growth rather 
than an unchanging Newtonian universe.119  Consider two late-
nineteenth-century constitutionalists:  Sidney George Fisher and C.G. 
Tideman.  For Fisher, government was “a machine for applying prin-
ciples and imposing rules of conduct essential to the well-being of a 
people.”120  The results it supplies may vary, but “its ‘real being,’ to use 
Plato’s language, consist[s] of the idea or truth it is intended to mani-
fest and execute.”121  The set of principles devised by the Founding, 
Fisher argued, called for cautious growth.  For Tiedeman, by contrast, 
the “fundamental principles which form the constitution of a state 
cannot be created by any governmental or popular edict; they are 
necessarily found imbedded in the national character.”122  Tiedeman’s 
account of the legitimacy of living constitutionalism lay in a combina-
tion of founding intent and popular will. 
Writing after the turn of the Twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson 
spoke of constitutional growth with similar echoes of Enlightenment 
thought.  Wilson argued that a constitution might shift in meaning 
over time but it cannot shift in principle.  No method but the “prin-
ciple of growth,” he argued, “has legitimate place in a system which 
depends for its very life upon its integrity, upon the candor and good 
conscience of its processes, upon keeping faith with its standards and 
its immemorial promises.”123  Judges, therefore, must “prove them-
selves such men as can discriminate between the opinion of the mo-
ment and the opinion of the age, between the opinion which springs, 
a legitimate essence, from the enlightened judgment of men of 
thought and good conscience, and the opinion of desire, . . . of im-
pulse and impatience.”124  It was the task of the public, by contrast, to 
sustain courts capable of such inquiry into truth. 
 
119 For a discussion of the substitution of Darwin for Newton, see, for example, Bruce 
Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1794–1801 (2007).  It bears 
emphasis that arguments that purport to derive from first principles need not yield an 
unchanging Newtonian result.  They may just as well yield a Darwinian notion of constitu-
tional evolution. 
120 SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRIAL OF THE CONSTITUTION 17 (Negro Univs. Press, 1969) 
(1862). 
121 Id. 
122 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 16 
(Wm. S. Hein & Co. 1974) (1890). 
123 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 159 (1908). 
124 Id. at 172. 
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The Enlightenment ideal is on display, as well, in the scientific 
approaches to constitutionalism that would reach their apex in Loch-
ner v. New York.125  Long before that decision, Christopher Columbus 
Langdell advanced a vision that law could be made both perfectly 
formal and perfectly coherent.  As Thomas C. Grey describes Lang-
dell’s orthodoxy, “law is a science; its materials are all in law books; 
behind the mass of those materials are a few simple principles; and 
discovery of those principles will allow us to ‘master the ever-tangled 
skein of human affairs.’”126  This view, infused with a notion of evolu-
tion, fed the Lochner Court’s vision that the judge was to construct a 
reasonable constitutional system in accordance with scientific gov-
ernance.127  Once again, a broad inquiry based in fact would yield the 
coherent structure dictated by our national constitution.  More than 
that, the elevation of science revived a brand of constitutional creativ-
ity similar to that associated with the Founding generation. 
The demise of Lochner did not mark the demise of science in con-
stitutional interpretation, nor the demise of the Enlightenment ideal.  
Both forces garnered criticism in the legal realist movement, which 
aspired to scientific understanding of the law but eschewed the no-
tion that legal interpretation pursued first principles, factual accura-
cy, or structural coherence.128  Although the Court rejected Lochner’s 
brand of science in the New Deal cases, it continued to accept a role 
for a different brand of science for discerning public values.  As Jus-
tice Jackson put it in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, the 
New Deal Court inhabited a world that had replaced the laissez faire 
 
125 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
126 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 51–52 (1983) (quoting C.C. 
Langdell, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii–ix (Bos., Little, Brown 
& Co., 2d ed. 1879)). 
127 For a discussion of Lochner in the frame of scientific governance, see KAHN, supra note 
102, at 97–117. 
128 Of course, the legal realist label has long been contested and of uncertain descriptive val-
ue.  See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 735–38 
(2009) (describing disputes among early legal realists about the meaning of the realist la-
bel).  The two strands mentioned here can be illustrated with reference to two of the 
most prominent realists.  Jerome Frank famously applied the tenets of psychoanalysis to 
law, arguing that we must eliminate the delusions produced by our collective search for a 
father figure in the law and instead question “not hastily, angrily, rebelliously, but calmly 
and dispassionately—our bequests from the past, our social heritage.”  JEROME FRANK, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 245 (1930).  Whereas Frank condemned the delusions pro-
duced by our pursuit of a father figure in the law, Thurman Arnold defended both the 
delusions of law and the incoherence they obscured.  See THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE 
SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 44 (1935) (“It is child’s play for the realist to show that law is 
not what it pretends to be . . . . Yet the legal realist falls into grave error when he believes 
this to be a defect in the law.”). 
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“principle of non-interference” with principles demanding “closer in-
tegration of society” and “governmental controls.”129  In reaching that 
conclusion, the Court drew on principle:  Lochner, it argued, had con-
travened the “principles” demanded by the Commerce Clause.130  By 
returning to first principles, the Court purported to right the ship. 
For constitutional theorists, the task of the post-New Deal era lay 
in legitimating that reversal within a coherent constitutional frame-
work.  The Court’s decision in Brown made it difficult to tell a story of 
simple repudiation—what was the scope of the judicial power?  Once 
again, theorists labored to discern the dictates of our constitutional 
body.  In his 1958 Holmes Lectures, Learned Hand returned to Mar-
bury only to find the decision more expansive than the constitutional 
text.  Accordingly, he devised a theory of judicial review rooted in po-
litical theory.131  A year later, Herbert Wechsler employed a similar 
approach to reach a different result.  Wechsler’s claim that judicial 
review can only be legitimate when it is “entirely principled” echoes 
the voices of Enlightenment present at the Founding.132  Interpreta-
tion, for Wechsler, demanded an unwavering commitment to first 
principles:  we must parse each issue in each case and arrive at a re-
sult that would apply across the broader constitutional universe.133 
In these debates, the Enlightenment ideal served as a litmus test 
for proposed theories.  Like Hand and Wechsler, Alexander Bickel 
advanced a theory of judicial review that promised “principled adju-
dications.”134  Bickel’s path to principle, however, left his theory more 
of a scholarly foil than an accepted account of constitutional mean-
ing.  Scholars rejected Bickel’s claim that “[n]o good society can be 
unprincipled; and no viable society can be principle-ridden.”135  They 
derided the obscurantism and contradiction seemingly allowed by 
Bickel’s notion of prudence.136  Instead, theorists gravitated toward 
 
129 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943). 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941) (“The conclusion is inescap-
able that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the principles which have prevailed 
in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since the deci-
sion . . . [and] should be and now is overruled.”). 
131 HAND, supra note 110, at 27. 
132 Wechsler, supra note 52, at 19. 
133 Id. 
134 BICKEL, supra note 53, at 205. 
135 Id. at 64. 
136 Perhaps most notably, see Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Com-
ment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1964) (“One 
watches with fascination as Bickel walks his tightrope, as he manipulates his nonprinci-
pled techniques of accommodation to preserve a precarious balance.”).  More generally, 
see Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE. L.J. 1567, 1606–
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theories more transparently committed to Enlightenment.  Accord-
ingly, John Hart Ely’s process-based theory has had more staying 
power than Bickel’s.  Ely’s theory of judicial review claims consistency 
with principle, historical fact, and a broad constitutional coherence.137   
Prominent competing theories exhibit an even more overt con-
cern with coherence and factual accuracy in constitutional interpreta-
tion.  Consider two such theories:  Bruce Ackerman’s theory of dual-
ist democracy and Frank Michelman’s theory of civic republicanism.  
For Ackerman, constitutional history reveals a constitutional order 
rooted in extra-textual amendment and intergenerational synthesis.  
If only we look, he claims, a coherent system of principled meaning 
emerges.  In essence, Ackerman strikes the same pose as the Framers:  
He surveys our collective history to capture the coherent constitu-
tional system it must contain.138  For Michelman, the essence of our 
constitutional system lies in inquiries like Ackerman’s.  In the notion 
of civic republicanism, Michelman endeavors to place such inquiry at 
the core of the task of nine justices of the Supreme Court.  There, 
through dialogue, Michelman envisions a project of constitutional 
discovery much like that undertaken by the Framers.139  In these two 
theories, and others, the rhetoric of Enlightenment lives on. 
C.  Mythology, Disjunction, and Enlightenment 
As the preceding Parts should make clear, a dominant constitutive 
myth of our constitutional order decries mythology and disjunction.  
The Enlightenment ideal refuses to distinguish between constitutive 
mythology and objective falsehood, and it refuses to allow objective 
falsehood to influence constructions of constitutional meaning.  That 
 
08 (1985) (describing the rise of a “rationalist spirit” that has rendered Bickel’s notion of 
prudence “an embarrassed virtue in a discipline that has always been hospitable to it”). 
137 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 101–04 (1980) 
(asserting that conceiving of judicial review as a mechanism to police political representa-
tion is consistent with past constitutional practice and constitutional coherence in a 
manner that prevailing interpretive modes are not). 
138 Notably, the coherent constitutional meaning Ackerman discerns places contemporary 
Americans in the same position as the Framers.  For Ackerman, “[i]t is only by talking to-
gether about the deepest values of dualist democracy that we can reflect on the best ways 
to continue the ongoing American engagement with higher lawmaking.”  1 ACKERMAN, 
supra note 31, at 57. 
139 Michelman, supra note 54; see also Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 
1524–32 (1988) (arguing that a civic republican view of constitutionalism legitimates ju-
dicial review because it helps “make credible for contemporary Americans the idea of so-
cial and procedural conditions under which communicative revision of a citizen’s norma-
tive understandings escapes condemnation as oppression” and because it enables the 
“plurality on which [our] capacity for transformative self-renewal depends”). 
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is, there is no such thing as a desirable falsehood or a desirable in-
consistency.  When we develop a theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion, these are the ground rules.  Like so many constitutive myths, 
however, the Enlightenment ideal does not marshal a vigorous argu-
ment for its own justification.  Defenders invoke concerns about 
popular sovereignty and political morality.  Yet they do not offer 
much of a response to scholars who have advanced visions of reason 
that call for departures from constitutional truth. 
Take criticism of legal fictions.  First, scholars attack the legal fic-
tion’s distortion of reality as a threat to appropriate constructions of 
the law.  The law may accept the distortion, but this does not elimi-
nate the false premise.140  Second, scholars contend that fictions pro-
duce obscurantism and confusion about the law.  Falsehoods draw 
our attention away from factors animating legal decisions and they 
introduce complication into the legal fabric.141  Third, scholars charge 
legal fictions with bringing the law into disrepute for its endorsement 
of patent falsehoods.  A single visible falsehood, by this view, may 
harm the institution of legal ordering.142  These three criticisms do lit-
tle more than parrot Enlightenment conclusions.  Fictions distort the 
law because our view of the law disallows them.  Fictions confuse be-
cause we do not theorize about them.  Fictions sully the law’s reputa-
tion because we construct a reputation that eschews fictions. 
Criticism of legal myth evokes a similarly conclusory flavor.  
Scholars attack legal myth on two primary grounds.  First, legal myth 
inhibits our ability to reason to first principles.  Suppose that no per-
son recognizes the falsehood of a particular premise.  The legal myth 
preserves that false premise and accordingly produces mistaken con-
clusions.143  Second, legal myth inhibits democratic processes.  Sup-
pose that a few people recognize the falsehood of a particular prem-
 
140 This critique is so omnipresent it hardly needs detailing.  For a colorful statement, see 
Jeremy Bentham, Scotch Reform, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 13 (John Bowring 
ed., 1962) (defining legal fiction as a “willful falsehood, uttered by a judge, for the pur-
pose of giving to injustice the colour of justice”). 
141 See, e.g., MAINE, supra note 18, at 26 (arguing that “it is unworthy of us to effect an admit-
tedly beneficial object by so rude a device as the legal fiction” because the legal fiction 
“makes the law either more difficult to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious 
order”). 
142 Although Roscoe Pound would later become more accepting of the legal fiction, his ini-
tial work criticized it largely for this reason.  See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 
7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 384 (1907) (“[I]n a modern state, spurious interpretation of stat-
utes, and especially constitutions, tends to bring law into disrepute.”). 
143 This is one of the most common strands within the law review genre; the author exposes a 
supposed myth and then charts the course to rectify the consequences of that myth.  See, 
e.g., Ely, supra note 27 (conducting such an analysis of the Erie doctrine). 
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ise, but most do not.  Those left in the dark would be subject to the 
whims of those aware of the light.  In a purely functional sense, this 
state of affairs pushes popular dialogue away from prevailing views of 
democracy.144  In a more philosophical sense, it threatens to impinge 
on concerns with equality, transparency, dignity, and the like.145  The-
se assaults on legal myth, however, seldom occupy the legal scholar.  
For her, their conclusions are simply assumed. 
Scholars have not advanced much additional justification for their 
condemnation of disjunction.  In essence, they argue that falsehood 
obscures genuine legal meaning.  As Karl Llewellyn argued, “[a] the-
ory which suffers from any such misrepresentation of the facts con-
fuses and distorts issues.  It cannot help but lead, repeatedly, to pur-
blind action.”146  Such action, Llewellyn argues, “even when it is 
informed by considerable intuition, registers an unfortunate number 
of misses on occasions when bull’s-eyes are needed.”147  Of course, if a 
constitutional theory provided a place for legal fiction and legal 
myth, they could be accommodated without rendering disjunction.  A 
theory that accepted all legal fictions and legal myths would be no 
theory at all, but a theory that allowed some would merely be a theory 
contrary to the Enlightenment ideal.148  Attacks on disjunction rarely 
endeavor to criticize such theories—or, indeed, to acknowledge their 
possibility. 
This omission flies in the face of a small but substantial group of 
scholars that has advanced affirmative arguments for mythology and 
disjunction.  These arguments have taken two forms.  One group of 
scholars has questioned the internal consistency of the Enlighten-
ment ideal.  For these scholars, the Enlightenment ideal represents 
another legal fiction if not a legal myth.  Accordingly, they have sug-
gested that we eschew the ideal and recognize our acceptance of my-
thology and disjunction.  Another group has defended mythology 
and disjunction despite their contravention of the Enlightenment 
 
144 This line of criticism is one motivating force behind Bruce Ackerman’s effort to expose 
the process of extratextual amendment.  Only with prevailing myths exposed, the argu-
ment goes, can our constitutional system function in accordance with popular will.  See 1 
ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 3–6 (describing the “reconstructive enterprise” interpreta-
tion of the Constitution). 
145 For example, John Rawls argues that publicity must be a condition for reaching a concept 
of right.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 130 & n.5 (1971). 
146 K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1934) (foot-
note omitted). 
147 Id. at 3. 
148 That is, a theory that accepted all legal fictions and legal myths would accept any false-
hood, and thus would fail to meaningfully differentiate any two systems of meaning. 
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ideal.  These scholars reject the Enlightenment ideal as a suboptimal 
constitutional principle, not because it fails to satisfy its own princi-
ples.  They contend that some deftly introduced mythology and dis-
junction may assist our constitutional order. 
Consider, first, scholarly efforts to expose the internal contradic-
tions of the Enlightenment ideal.  The Enlightenment ideal, accord-
ing to scholars of this view, is no more foundational than any other 
system of social meaning.  Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s 
classic treatment of the Enlightenment puts the point nicely.  “In the 
enlightened world,” they write, “mythology has entered into the pro-
fane.  In its blank purity, the reality which has been cleansed of de-
mons and their conceptual descendents assumes the numinous char-
acter which the ancient world attributed to demons.”149  The 
particular brand of reason advanced by Enlightenment thought, they 
argue, inevitably collapses upon itself.  That is, the Enlightenment 
ideal is itself a product of mythology and devolves into the transpar-
ent falsehood Adorno and Horkheimer perceived in European fas-
cism.150 
Legal scholars have extended this notion to the Enlightenment’s 
influence on our visions of the Constitution.  Echoing calls among 
the legal realists, Max Lerner argued that “[e]very tribe needs its to-
tem and its fetish, and the Constitution is ours.”151  For Lerner, this 
constitutional reverence produced a vision of judges not as “ordinary 
men, subject to ordinary passions, but ‘discoverers’ of final truth, 
priests in the service of a godhead.”152  A similar view prompted San-
ford Levinson, years hence, to warn that “[t]he ‘death of constitu-
tionalism’ may be the central event of our time just as the ‘death of 
God’ was that of the past century (and for much the same reason).”153  
The Enlightenment ideal, in this sense, sows the seeds of its own de-
struction. 
A few scholars have taken up Levinson’s warning and embraced 
the possibility of the death of constitutionalism.  Steven D. Smith has 
argued that given the “labyrinthine emptiness” that characterizes 
 
149 THEODOR W. ADORNO & MAX HORKHEIMER, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 28 (John 
Cumming trans., 1997). 
150 See, e.g., id. at 194 (“True madness lies primarily in immutability, in the inability of the 
thought to participate in the negativity in which thought—in contradistinction to fixed 
judgment—comes into its own.  The paranoiac insistence on rationality, the poor infinity 
of an unchanging judgment, reveals a lack of sequacious thought.”). 
151 Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1294 (1937). 
152 Id. at 1312. 
153 Sanford Levinson, “The Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 
151. 
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constitutional interpretation,154 it may be true that “reason teaches 
the futility of trying to live in accordance with reason.”155  Pierre 
Schlag has been less equivocal.  He argues that reason inevitably de-
volves into a dogmatic force that serves the law’s will rather than any 
foundational set of principles.  Reason becomes the excuse to con-
struct “endless legal mazes” rather than a force that deepens under-
standing.156  “When reason runs out, but continues to rule,” Schlag 
argues, “we get precisely what we see all around us—the excessive 
construction of a pervasively shallow form of life.”157  For these schol-
ars, the way out lies in replacing dogma with genuine engagement. 
These arguments, however, have garnered little sustained re-
sponse from adherents of the Enlightenment ideal.  They have occu-
pied the fringes of the Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies 
Movements, and they have been rejected more as inconvenient than 
incorrect.  In this sense, Owen Fiss spoke for an entire legal ortho-
doxy when he rejected the view that we cannot reason to objective 
constitutional meaning:  “It must be combated and can be, though 
perhaps only by affirming the truth which is being denied . . . .”158  
There is not much debate about the merits of reason, much less En-
lightenment reason.  The conclusion is assumed, and contrarians 
merely contrarians.159 
Consider, next, scholarly efforts to defend the introduction of my-
thology and disjunction in legal interpretation.  Scholars have de-
fended legal fictions as tools of both expediency and coherence.  
Blackstone argued that so long as the law follows the maxim that “no 
fiction should extend to work an injury,” fictions would be “highly 
beneficial and useful” as a means to “prevent a mischief, or remedy 
an inconvenience, that might result from the general rule of law.”160  
John Chipman Gray expressed doubts about the potential legal dis-
tortions that might arise from remedies of this sort, but he defended 
legal fictions that organize the structure of the law.161  Perhaps most 
 
154 STEVEN D. SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION & THE PRIDE OF REASON 123 (1998). 
155 Id. at 150. 
156 PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 144 (1998). 
157 Id. at 145. 
158 Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 763 (1982). 
159 For a prescient description of the declining influence of challenges like the one to which 
Fiss responded, see Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies:  A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 
1515, 1537–44 (1991). 
160 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 19, at *43. 
161 JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 36 (Gaunt, Inc. 1999) 
(1909) (arguing that fictions “should never be used, as the historic fictions were used to 
change the Law, but only for the purpose of classifying established rules”). 
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prominently, Lon Fuller combined these strands, arguing that legal 
fictions allow us “to plaster together the weak spots in our intellectual 
structure.”162  There have not been comparably systematic defenses 
for legal fiction in the constitutional realm, but occasional defenses 
of individual fictions evoke the same two concerns.163  Active defenses 
of constitutional fictions, however, are rare. 
Defenses of legal myths take two similar tacks.  First, scholars ar-
gue that legal myths may help improve substantive outcomes in a util-
itarian sense.  Meir Dan-Cohen, for example, has defended an 
“acoustic separation” between rules applied by judges and rules per-
ceived by the public.164  Such a separation, Dan-Cohen argues, may 
help improve compliance with criminal law.165  Second, scholars argue 
that legal myths allow us to diffuse the destructive consequences of 
choices between irreconcilable values.  This view is most associated 
with Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbit’s analysis of tragic choices,166 
though it has a longer history in American law.167  Scholars of this 
bent have argued that although we should presume in favor of can-
dor, candor may undermine confidence in the law.  Although neither 
of these arguments has singled out the constitutional realm, they ap-
ply there with as much force as in the common law or statutory con-
texts. 
Beneath these defenses of legal fiction and legal myth lie defenses 
of disjunction.  Of course, an interpretive theory might demand cer-
tain legal fictions and legal myths.  In such case, the presence of 
those fictions and myths would signal conjunction rather than dis-
junction.  The defenses just enumerated, however, seek to justify de-
partures from theory rather than to justify falsehood within theory.  
They excuse departures from a broader theory of interpretation.  The 
 
162 FULLER, supra note 17, at 52. 
163 For example, David Currie described the rule in Ex Parte Young as based on an “outland-
ish conceptual justification” and yet argued that “[b]ehind the outlandish conceptual jus-
tification concocted to support this holding lay the not implausible conviction that feder-
al constitutional rights could not be adequately protected without the intervention of 
federal equity; therefore the philosophy of immunity had to yield.”  David P. Currie, The 
Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1964). 
164 Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630 (1984). 
165 Id. at 668 (arguing that “the clarity and specificity of decision rules, and hence their effec-
tiveness as guidelines, may be enhanced by the use of a technical, esoteric terminology 
that is incomprehensible to the public at large”). 
166 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
167 See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 128, at 247–48 (arguing that the “greatness of law” lies in its 
creation of an “appearance of unity while tolerating and enforcing ideals which run in all 
sorts of opposing directions,” which “provides a way of talking about all the unsolved and 
unsolvable problems of society”). 
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legal fiction circumvents the dictates of an interpretive theory for the 
sake of some combination of expedience and coherence.  The legal 
myth obscures departures from an interpretive theory for similar rea-
sons.  A theory cannot develop an account of its legitimate circum-
vention; this would merely alter the content of the range of actions 
legitimated by the theory.  Prevailing defenses of legal fiction and le-
gal myth, then, defend more than just falsehood; they defend dis-
junction. 
Once again, proponents of the Enlightenment ideal have not re-
sponded with much more than condemnation.  Defenses of legal fic-
tion have not been met with much more than the claim that false-
hood anywhere is a threat to constitutionalism everywhere.168  In these 
assertions, rhetoric runs thick; the refrain echoes Bentham’s quip 
that fiction constitutes “a syphilis” in the law.169  Defenses of legal 
myth have been met with much the same.  David L. Shapiro sums up 
the prevailing view that no scholar has rebutted the presumption for 
judicial candor in any significant way.170  Although Dan-Cohen and 
Calabresi’s arguments against candor garnered much scholarly inter-
est, they have not garnered many followers.  Given the condemnation 
of both legal fiction and legal myth, disjunction has not received any 
sustained attention. 
III.  THE COMMON LAW CULTURE 
Our constitutional order may have been born in a time of En-
lightenment, but it emerged within a common law culture.  The 
Framers and their successors did not eschew that culture; rather, they 
enshrined it in our constitutional processes and our constitutional 
discourse.  Whereas the Enlightenment tradition invokes a notion of 
reason as the key to an ordered universe, the common law culture in-
vokes the stabilizing power of tradition.  The common law culture 
calls upon the judge to reason, but not in an Enlightenment sense.  
Permissible judicial inquiry occupies boundaries shaped by past expe-
rience.  As this Part demonstrates, the judicial inquiry demanded by 
 
168 For a more searching recent analysis, see generally Smith, supra note 26 (analyzing “new 
legal fictions” and arguing that their benefits are outweighed by the presumption in favor 
of judicial candor. 
169 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING, in 5 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM, supra note 21, at 92. 
170 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731 (1987).  Shapiro 
only finds the case against candor compelling when (1) a judge faces a conflict between a 
legal and moral right, (2) the judge decides he has a moral duty to support the moral 
right, and (3) resignation will not fulfill the judge’s moral duty.  Id. at 749–50. 
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the common law culture self-consciously allows for mythology and dis-
junction in constitutionalism. 
This Part explores five elements of our constitutional system that 
arose out of the common law:  justiciability doctrine, stare decisis, the 
rule against retroactivity, the distinction between holding and dicta, 
and the practice of writing separately.  The first three elements pre-
serve false constructions of constitutional meaning.  Justiciability pre-
vents courts from assessing mythology and disjunction that arises be-
yond a particular type of controversy.  Stare decisis does not allow 
courts to correct mythology and disjunction even when it is properly 
before them.  Retroactivity doctrine forbids courts from redressing 
past decisions built on foundations of mythology and disjunction.  
The last two elements—dicta and writing separately—expose these 
realities for all to see. 
A.  Justiciability 
Justiciability doctrine arising under the language about “cases” or 
“controversies” in Article III has long been condemned as incoherent 
and unprincipled.171  Much of it has been cast as the product of judi-
cial invention.172  This is quite understandable.  It does not take much 
effort to notice the wealth of meaning courts have imparted onto Ar-
ticle III’s Delphic notion of the “judicial Power.”173  Nor does the no-
tion captured by justiciability lend itself to a clearly defined set of 
rules or standards.  Efforts to justify this body of doctrine, nonethe-
less, often turn to the understanding of the Framers.174  These efforts 
invariably invoke the prevailing vision of the judiciary at common law.  
The notion of justiciability, though not explicit in common law 
courts, grasps at the private-law judicial function embodied in those 
courts.175 
 
171 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  For a recent articulation of this line of criticism, see Jonathan 
R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 74–75 (2007). 
172 See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:  Insti-
tutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1004 (2002) (“[N]o one seriously be-
lieves that the Framers chose [the words of Article III, Section 2] with anything like the 
Supreme Court’s doctrinal framework in mind or that the Court’s justiciability rulings are 
anything other than a judicially invented gloss on the Constitution.”). 
173 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
174 See, e.g., Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 689, 691 (2004) (arguing that “history does not defeat standing doctrine; 
the notion of standing is not an innovation, and its constitutionalization does not contra-
dict a settled historical consensus about the Constitution’s meaning” (emphasis omit-
ted)). 
175 For a statement to this effect, see, for example, Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 340 (1988) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the case or controversy requirement has “virtually no 
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This is not to say that modern justiciability doctrine enshrines the 
particularities of the judicial role at common law.  Modern views of 
justiciability echo elements of the English system in some respects but 
not in others.  The constitutional prohibition on advisory opinions, 
for example, has been settled law since the first years of the Republic, 
but no such prohibition existed at common law.176  In refusing to is-
sue an advisory opinion at the request of George Washington, the 
Court invoked the Constitution’s separation of powers.177  Modern 
supporters of this conclusion have bolstered it with structural argu-
ments.178  To take another example, scholars largely agree that mod-
ern standing doctrine creates limitations that were not present at 
common law.179 
Justiciability doctrines with common law roots, however, promote 
common law notions of litigation and adjudication.  Consider, for ex-
ample, the requirement of adverse parties.  Although the Court has 
reached the merits of some collusive cases,180 it has read Article III’s 
“case” or “controversy” requirement to preclude such cases.181  In so 
doing, the Court has cast the judicial power in the common law 
mold:  it is the power to resolve disputes in an adversarial process.  
Common law courts may have entertained advisory opinions for the 
Crown, but they did not entertain them for private parties.  In its rela-
tion to private parties, the judicial role did not extend to abstract in-
terpretive inquiries; rather, it extended to the resolution of genuine 
disputes.182 
 
meaning” except by reference “to the traditional, fundamental limitations upon the pow-
ers of common law courts”). 
176 See STEWART JAY, MOST HUMBLE SERVANTS:  THE ADVISORY ROLE OF EARLY JUDGES 57–76 
(1997). 
177 Id. at 179–80. 
178 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 647 
(1996) (arguing that the Framers designed the Opinion Clause “to clarify the role of a 
new and distinctly American idea of a President, who would be measurably less than an 
English-style King, but measurably more than an English-style Prime Minister”). 
179 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 690 (recognizing that this is a “widely ac-
cepted academic critique[]”).  For a prominent exposition of this critique, see Raoul 
Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions:  Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 
818 (1969) (arguing that standing is “a judicial construct pure and simple which . . . is of 
relatively recent origin”). 
180 See e.g., Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33–34 (1804) (reaching “a feigned is-
sue”). 
181 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943). 
182 This story of the judicial role, of course, does not adequately account for the rise of pub-
lic law.  See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (describing the characteristic attributes of public law litigation’s 
party relationships and judicial role as compared with the American legal system’s “tradi-
tional model” of litigation). 
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The judicial role might look quite different.  We might allow 
courts to engage in legal interpretation absent a genuine dispute.  
For the common law lawyer, the particular facts of the dispute before 
the court make the inquiry into law possible.  It is not merely that 
facts allow the judge to engage the intricacies of the law; the zealous 
advocacy of adverse parties served to ensure the accuracy of that en-
gagement.183  Civil-law systems, of course, provide a more limited 
place for zealous advocacy in a process dominated by judicial inquiry.  
The judicial task turns more on inquiring into facts than discerning 
law provided by statute.184  Some constitutional courts, moreover, al-
low for inquiries into constitutional questions before they arise in an 
individualized dispute.185 
Modern defenses of justiciability doctrine invoke two broad argu-
ments about the judicial role.  First, justiciability requirements ensure 
that adjudication addresses concrete issues brought by zealous advo-
cates.  Second, justiciability requirements ensure that the courts do 
not overstep their bounds vis-à-vis the political branches.  The former 
argument has roots in the common law notion of private rights.  It 
contends that litigants should have a stake in a genuine dispute capa-
ble of judicial redress.186  The latter argument draws on both constitu-
tional structure and the common law notion that courts interpret law 
rather than make it.  This argument claims that courts should ensure 
that the judicial process is representative, passive, and divorced from 
politics.  In essence, these defenses set forth a vision of both the sub-
ject matter and the scope of adjudication.187 
This common law vision of adjudication accepts a role for mythol-
ogy and disjunction.  Return to the adverse-party requirement.  The 
 
183 For a discussion of the influence of the common law’s adversarial process on the Ameri-
can legal system, see ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:  THE AMERICAN WAY OF 
LAW 3–58 (2001) (“Many, perhaps most, American lawyers, judges, legal scholars, and 
politicians (many of whom are lawyers) see adversarial litigation as a vital tool for righting 
wrongs, curtailing governmental and corporate arbitrariness, and achieving a just socie-
ty.”). 
184 See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:  AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 37 (1969) (describing the civil-law 
judge as “a kind of expert clerk” who is “presented with a fact situation to which a ready 
legislative response will be readily found in all except the extraordinary case”). 
185 See Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 914 (2006) (de-
scribing both foreign and state courts that engage in this practice). 
186 In Baker v. Carr, for example, the Court explained that standing doctrine ensures that a 
party seeking relief has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy 
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”  
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
187 For an overview and critique of these theories, see Siegel, supra note 171, at 90–120. 
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notion that adverse parties preserve a bounded judicial role con-
sistent with the separation of powers rings hollow; subject to standing 
requirements, private parties may contrive adverse cases to garner ju-
dicial review.188  The notion that adverse parties enhance the truth-
seeking function of the adjudicative process is more plausible.189  
Such benefits, however, come at the expense of rendering the lawyer 
an agent of advocacy rather than accuracy.  Adjudication becomes an 
obscurantist battle in which the parties, constrained by loose ethical 
requirements, often pursue misunderstanding of law and fact.  In-
deed, the victorious lawyer may celebrate a decision reliant on my-
thology and disjunction.190 
Of course, the task of the judge is to thwart such efforts.  We 
might accept the obscurantist tendencies of adversarial litigation if it 
nonetheless presents the best path to interpretive truth.  Parties 
would advance mythology and disjunction, but the successful judge 
would root it out.  Madison might argue that the adversity require-
ment serves the same purpose as the separation of powers:  to chan-
nel inevitable self-interest into collective truth.191  A few duped judges, 
we might say, are well worth the broader benefits of the adversarial 
system.  This story may fail to grapple adequately with the array of ob-
scurantist tools available to the lawyer, but it is nonetheless plausi-
ble.192  Justiciability doctrines like standing, ripeness, and mootness, 
by contrast, take a more unequivocally permissive view of mythology 
and disjunction. 
 
188 See id. at 94 (“[C]ases do not just come along.  Individuals and interest groups create cas-
es for the specific purpose of getting courts to resolve legal issues and to compel the gov-
ernment to obey the laws.”). 
189 For a defense of the adversarial system along these lines, see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 384 (1978) (“[T]he role of the lawyer as a 
partisan advocate appears not as a regrettable necessity, but as an indispensable part of a 
larger ordering of affairs.  The institution of advocacy is not a concession to the frailties 
of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the design of a social framework 
within which man’s capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization.”).  See 
generally STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM:  A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 
(1984). 
190 See Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1039 
(1975) (“[T]he gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily crusading 
after truth, but seeking to win”). 
191 That is, we might think of Madison’s call that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract 
ambition” as a generalization of this mode of common law adjudication.  THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 51, at 347 (James Madison) (Heritage Press 1945). 
192 As Frankel notes, for example, the rules of professional responsibility only proscribe posi-
tive frauds; they do not compel disclosures of material facts or forbid material omissions.  
Frankel, supra note 190, at 1057–58 (arguing that the rules of professional responsibility 
should compel a lawyer to disclose material facts, and should forbid a lawyer from making 
material omissions unless he or she is prevented by privilege). 
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Let us focus on standing.  Since the formal emergence of standing 
doctrine after the New Deal, scholars have disputed its origins at 
common law.  Invoking mandamus practice and qui tam statutes that 
preceded the Founding, a vocal group of scholars have sought to cast 
doubt on the constitutional basis for the doctrine.193  These scholars 
have cast the doctrine as a fiction invented by Justice Frankfurter and 
Justice Brandeis.194  Another set of scholars has set out to defend the 
constitutional basis for standing doctrine by identifying the concept 
of standing, if not the term itself, in the common law’s distinction be-
tween public and private rights.  These scholars argue that private ac-
tions to protect public rights were rare at common law, if present at 
all.195  Nonetheless, the concept of standing evokes the private-law 
orientation present at common law. 
Defenses of the concept of standing appeal to each of the argu-
ments advanced in defense of justiciability doctrine more broadly.  
Although the contours of the doctrine are much disputed and ma-
ligned, scholars often contend that standing doctrine ensures zealous 
advocacy and constrains judicial overstep.196  These arguments are 
seldom contested in the realm of private harms like tort.  To confer 
standing on parties not privy to the harm would impose additional 
costs on harmed parties who choose not to seek redress in court.197  In 
the realm of public rights, however, the arguments are more contro-
versial.  Parties who do not meet standing requirements may engage 
in less zealous advocacy than would parties who do.198  Moreover, 
standing requirements hardly prevent courts from ruling on issues of 
great social importance. 
Standing doctrine promotes mythology and disjunction in at least 
two ways.  First, standing doctrine’s vague requirements of injury in 
 
193 See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 690–91 (identifying this line of criticism). 
194 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992). 
195 See, e.g., Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 174, at 692 (grounding modern standing doc-
trines in the “distinction between . . . public and private rights” recognized by eighteenth-
and-nineteenth-century courts). 
196 See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 624 (2004) (“The 
standing doctrine also promotes other judicial values, including zealous advocacy and 
impartial results.  Injured parties are likely to pursue their claims vigorously and the ad-
versary process enables courts to uncover all the relevant facts and issues necessary to 
reach the best and most fair outcomes.”). 
197 That is, parties who did not wish to litigate their claims could be called upon to partici-
pate in aspects of the litigation seeking to vindicate those claims. 
198 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest:  Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1309, 1409 (1995) (“While the Court has stated, for example, that standing is de-
signed to promote zealous advocacy, it has denied standing to the unquestionably zealous 
Sierra Club.”). 
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fact, causation, and redressability allow judicial obscurantism and eva-
sion.  That is, courts may cloak the real grounds for their decisions in 
considerations about standing.199  In so doing, courts introduce false-
hood into the stream of the law.  Second, standing doctrine prevents 
courts from reaching the merits of disputes, particularly those involv-
ing diffuse public rights.  In controversies that implicate constitution-
al questions, this allows mythology and disjunction to persist apart 
from judicial inquiry.  The result is not only non-enforcement; it is 
non-interpretation.200  In tandem, these two forces prompt courts to 
both contribute misunderstanding to the law and preserve that mis-
understanding. 
Many scholars have expressed concern about standing doctrine’s 
relationship with both obscurantism and non-enforcement.201  Fewer 
have expressed concerns about its relationship with substantive con-
stitutional interpretation.  The cardinal interpretive sin in our legal 
order is to reach constitutional issues unnecessary for the disposition 
of the case at bar.  It is to such actions that the oft-repeated charge of 
“judicial activism” perhaps best applies.202  The canon of constitution-
al avoidance formalizes this view:  we should be wary about deciding 
constitutional issues lest we get them wrong.  Presumptions against 
interpretation call upon courts to preserve prevailing views of consti-
tutional truth without interrogating them.  There may be good rea-
sons for such presumptions; in the short term, they produce con-
sistency and stability.203  In the long term, however, they allow 
falsehood and infidelity in constitutional interpretation. 
Concerns about reaching constitutional questions unnecessary to 
the case at hand occupy the shadow of the common law doctrine of 
stare decisis.  To misconstrue the Constitution would not only do in-
 
199 As Abram Chayes famously put this charge, the Court engages in a “ritual recitation” of 
the requirements for standing and then “chooses up sides and decides the case.”  Abram 
Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term—Foreword:  Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (1982). 
200 This is the same result as another feature of common law adjudication:  settlement.  See 
Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984). 
201 See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 1371, 1373 n.14 (1988) (“Although it is probably impossible to document, I suspect 
that most academics and practicing lawyers at least share the suspicion that standing law 
is nothing more than a manipulation by the Court to decide cases while not appearing to 
decide their merits.”). 
202 For a discussion of how best to apply the term “judicial activism,” see Craig Green, An 
Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195, 1199 (2009) (arguing that this 
“label is useful only where a judge has violated cultural standards of judicial role”). 
203 For a defense of the constitutional avoidance canon, see, for example, BICKEL, supra note 
53, at 181–83; Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preserva-
tion of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1552 (2000). 
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justice in the present case; it would wreak havoc on future cases.  I 
will turn to stare decisis momentarily.  Before I do, however, it is 
worth noting that both mootness doctrine and ripeness doctrine pre-
sent the same possibility of mythology and disjunction as standing 
doctrine.  Each doctrine provides an avenue for judicial obscurantism 
and prevents interrogation of prevailing constitutional interpreta-
tions.  Justiciability doctrine, then, advances mythology and disjunc-
tion in two ways.  First, it promotes obfuscation by parties and courts.  
Second, it preserves the interpretive status quo regardless of its rela-
tionship with constitutional truth. 
B.  Stare Decisis 
Like so many central phrases of our constitutional discourse, 
“stare decisis” does not appear in the text of the Constitution.  Its tex-
tual mooring, moreover, is arguably more tenuous than that of justi-
ciability doctrine.204  While scholars have defended the concept of jus-
ticiability with respect to the separation of powers, stare decisis 
represents a doctrine more purely contained in judicial process.  So 
long as the political branches may rely on a consistent judicial view of 
precedent, it is difficult to argue that the structure of the constitu-
tional text mandates one view of stare decisis or another.  The textual 
basis for stare decisis, if there is one at all, must be found in the 
Founding vision of the “judicial Power” provided by Article III.  That 
is not to say that this basis is a stretch; stare decisis occupied the core 
of the common law tradition inherited by the Framers.205 
As it has evolved, the American notion of stare decisis has taken 
on a familiar set of conceptual divisions.  Courts distinguish between 
three levels of stare decisis:  common law stare decisis, statutory stare 
decisis, and constitutional stare decisis.  At common law, precedent 
garners heavy deference, whereas decisions on statutory and constitu-
tional grounds garner successively less.206  Repetition of this hierarchy 
 
204 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
723, 754–55 (1988) (discussing the uncertain constitutional source of stare decisis). 
205 The intent of the Framers on this point, perhaps unsurprisingly, is a rich area for scholar-
ly debate.  Compare Michael Stokes Paulson, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:  May Congress 
Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1550 (2000) (arguing 
that the Constitution does not require that the Court accord decision-altering weight to 
prior judicial precedent), with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution:  An 
Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 579–80 (2001) (arguing that the 
Framers understood “the judicial Power” to “include a power to create precedents of 
some degree of binding force” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
206 For a clear statement of the “three-tiered hierarchy” of stare decisis the Court follows, see 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988). 
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evades the more difficult conceptual question:  how should we think 
of the form of deference afforded by stare decisis?  Courts often in-
voke stare decisis to bolster independent conclusions on the merits.  
It is difficult to cast such pronouncements as instances of deference.  
Courts that make such decisions would have ruled the same way even 
in the absence of the prior decisions.  They are in no sense bound by 
precedent; rather, they invoke it in solidarity.207 
The deference captured by the notion of stare decisis requires 
something more.  As Max Radin describes it, “the rule of stare decisis is 
evidently and demonstrably being maintained only when the court 
declares that the conclusion to which the rule constrains it is one 
which it would not have reached except for the rule.”208  As examples, 
Radin refers to conclusions “of which the court does not morally ap-
prove, which cannot be rested on conscience, equity or the public 
welfare.”209  In the language of mythology and disjunction, the court 
may feel confined to perpetuate a disjunction rooted in mistaken vi-
sions of history, morality, or practice.  Radin’s formulation leaves out 
a broader class of cases that rely on stare decisis even if they do not 
say so expressly:  cases in which courts refuse to reopen questions that 
have already been decided.  Such questions occupy much of the con-
stitutional landscape as settled law.210 
It goes without saying that we could have a legal regime that es-
chewed such constraints.  Stare decisis does not exist at civil law.  The 
comparison need not suggest that eschewing stare decisis would nec-
essarily remake our judiciary in the image of the civil-law judge.211  In-
deed, a regime without stare decisis could expand the interpretive 
role of the judge.  Unconfined by prior decisions, she could expound 
the true character of the law.  Nor would abandoning stare decisis 
necessarily lead the judiciary to abandon history.  Judges could still 
invoke prior decisions to legitimate their present constructions of the 
 
207 For a recent example, see McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 3025 (2010).  In his opinion 
for the majority, Justice Alito grounded the Court’s extension of District of Columbia v. Hel-
ler, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), in its adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis even though the 
composition of the majority in McDonald was the same as the composition of the majority 
in Heller two years before and the reasoning similar.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 3049–50. 
208 Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis:  Concerning Präjudizienrecht in Amerika, 33 
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 201 (1933). 
209 Id. 
210 See Monaghan, supra note 204, at 744–46 (arguing that stare decisis has an agenda-
limiting function, whereby “[m]any constitutional issues are so far settled that they are 
simply off the agenda”). 
211 For a discussion of the role of stare decisis in civil-law regimes, see MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. 
LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY 
AND LEGITIMACY 54–55 (2004). 
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law.  In constitutional interpretation, moreover, the shifts in public 
understanding reflected in past decisions might assume interpretive 
significance, even if not binding significance.  Past decisions would 
not convey a rule or result to be followed, but rather a historical indi-
cia of perceived constitutional meaning.212 
In some sense, we subscribe to stare decisis because we have always 
subscribed to stare decisis.  Yet the doctrine draws fervent, if some-
what disjointed, theoretical defenses.  These defenses rely on three 
primary rationales.213  First, scholars and courts advance a range of 
utilitarian arguments that stare decisis ensures the coherence, legiti-
macy, and stability of the law.  It conserves judicial resources, protects 
reliance interests, aligns judicial inquiry with judicial competence, 
and the like.214  Second, scholars and courts advance a view rooted in 
fundamental fairness.  By this view, equality requires that like cases 
are decided alike, not just in a given moment but also across time.  
To decide like cases alike, by whichever metric of likeness, does not 
merely advance predictability, it ensures that the legal system safe-
guards the right to equal treatment.215 
The third defense of stare decisis relies on a more primal notion 
of the importance of history.  Anthony Kronman has advanced this 
view in distinguishing philosophy and law.  “We must respect the 
past,” he argues, “because the world of culture that we inherit from it 
makes us who we are.  The past is not something that we, as already 
constituted human beings, choose for one reason or another to re-
spect; rather, it is such respect that establishes our humanity in the 
first place.”216  Kronman’s argument, however, seldom accompanies 
the other two in the literature.217  Kronman has a ready explanation:  
“the immense prestige that reason now enjoys in every department of 
 
212 Id. at 55–56. 
213 I borrow this division from Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 
1029, 1036–43 (1990). 
214 See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1989) (describing 
precedent as enhancing the reliance value and the value of general rules); Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595–97 (1987) (arguing that precedential con-
straint enhances fairness by ensuring consistency and predictability). 
215 See Alexander, supra note 214, at 9–13 (arguing that reliance on precedent promotes 
equality); Schauer, supra note 214, at 596 (“Equality and precedent are thus, respectively, 
the spatial and temporal branches of the same normative principle of consistency.”). 
216 Kronman, supra note 213, at 1066. 
217 The tension between the more philosophical arguments for stare decisis and Kronman’s 
Burkean claim, however, has been used to describe tensions in our constitutional order 
present since the Founding.  See James Q. Whitman, Why Did the Revolutionary Lawyers Con-
fuse Custom and Reason? 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1991). 
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political life.”218  We respect past generations in hope that we might 
garner respect from future ones, but to merely worship the past con-
travenes our notions of reasoned political order. 
Accordingly, we paint a partial picture of stare decisis.  Consider 
the Court’s discussion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey.  For the Court, “the very concept of the rule of law un-
derlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that 
a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”219  Although 
this might evoke Kronman’s notion that historical fidelity confers 
contemporary meaning, the Court invoked “prudential and pragmat-
ic considerations,” grounded in utility and deontology.220  Three of 
the four Casey factors turn on utilitarian concerns about social order.  
The Court will abandon precedent if it is not workable, consistent, or 
legitimate.  The fourth factor, reliance, draws on both utilitarian con-
cerns and the deontological specter of inequity.221  Stare decisis, then, 
is required by reason; “no judicial system could do society’s work,” 
says the Court, “if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised 
it.”222 
Reason plays a somewhat counterintuitive role in the life of stare 
decisis.  Kronman’s view of stare decisis contravenes the view that we 
should structure society on the basis of reason alone rather than ven-
eration for antiquity.  Yet it helps to explain our veneration for the 
Constitution, a historical artifact central to our cultural understand-
ing.  The utilitarian and deontological defenses of stare decisis ad-
vance reason in their concern with stability and equality.  Yet stare 
decisis undermines the project of vindicating a transcendent constitu-
tional meaning.  In the name of stability and equality, it allows depar-
tures from constitutional truth.  As the Court affirmed in Casey, some 
departures may be too broad to allow.  Other departures, however, 
stand.          
 Stare decisis, then, calls upon courts to heed legal fictions and le-
gal myths and thereby uphold disjunctions introduced in the past.  
Whereas justiciability doctrine preserves the interpretive status quo by 
closing the courthouse doors, stare decisis preserves the interpretive 
status quo by confining the permissible interpretive arguments liti-
gants may make before the court.  Of course, we might view the Con-
stitution as a living document explicated by judicial decisions.  In this 
 
218 Kronman, supra note 213, at 1046. 
219 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. at 854–55. 
222 Id. at 854. 
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sense, recent history might be more foundational to constitutional 
meaning than distant history.  Such a view, however, would not ren-
der stare decisis an instrument of conjunction rather than disjunc-
tion.  To affirm past decisions would be to follow an interpretive the-
ory.  To follow stare decisis more broadly—and thus affirm past 
decisions when one’s view of true constitutional meaning disagrees 
with them—would still perpetuate mythology and disjunction.  
     Stare decisis also calls upon courts to extend existing mythology 
and disjunction into new areas of the law.  A present dispute may, 
upon occasion, mirror a prior dispute in every relevant detail.  In 
such cases, a court that adheres to a prior holding despite its best 
judgment of the merits will preserve the mythology and disjunction 
introduced by the prior court.  Many other disputes, however, will 
present similar yet distinct legal issues.  The combination of stare de-
cisis, analogical reasoning, and a commitment to coherence pushes 
courts to entrench mythology and disjunction in these cases.  Incon-
sistent views of constitutional interpretation, moreover, can yield a 
patchwork of precedents dramatically at odds with one another.  The 
task of reconciling these decisions may call for the introduction of 
new mythologies and thereby deepen existing disjunctions.  
     Perhaps it seems strange to cast stare decisis as contrary to the En-
lightenment ideal if the Framers considered it a part of their consti-
tutional order. Suppose you are an originalist and that the Framers 
advanced the same utilitarian and deontological arguments often 
raised to defend stare decisis today.  Stare decisis might represent an 
important part of the constitutional mechanism.  Why, then, would it 
contravene the Enlightenment ideal?  Stare decisis allows our consti-
tutional mechanism to consume itself through falsehood.  It subju-
gates true constitutional meaning to considerations external to that 
meaning. If we take a wrong turn on the path to constitutional truth, 
we might find ourselves no longer bound by the same constitutional 
mechanism that validated stare decisis in the first place.  In so doing, 
we would abandon our initial concern with factual accuracy or con-
ceptual coherence.223 
C.  Retroactivity 
Imagine that the Supreme Court recognized an error in a previ-
ous decision and, stare decisis notwithstanding, reversed the prior 
 
223 That is, we would no longer be originalists in the relevant sense.  Our adherence to stare 
decisis would lead us to abandon the interpretive mechanism that legitimated that very 
adherence. 
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decision.  It is not difficult to imagine such a situation.  Imagine, 
moreover, that the Court did not overrule the prior decision as in-
consistent with shifting public understandings.  Rather, the Court 
said that the decision misconstrues the Constitution now and miscon-
strued the Constitution when it was decided.224  How should the 
Court’s ruling affect litigants who brought claims under the old law?  
Should the new law be applied retroactively to the litigants now be-
fore the courts?  What about litigants whose claims were already de-
cided under the old law? 
At common law, the answer to these questions was fairly straight-
forward.  Indeed, the notion of retroactivity represents a modern 
construction.225  The common law constituted an unchanging con-
stant.  If a court misconstrued the law, its decision was wrong.  A party 
that litigated a case in which the court issued a new interpretation of 
the law was subject to the new interpretation.  Likewise, parties in the 
midst of litigating the same claim when the court overruled past 
precedent would be subject to the new rule.  A party whose claims 
had already been decided, by contrast, would be unable to reap the 
benefits of the new law.226  The results of past decisions would be final 
under res judicata and subject to very limited collateral attack.  For 
convicted criminal defendants, habeas jurisdiction rarely allowed re-
litigating portions of the merits.227 
The logic behind stare decisis seems to cut against both retroac-
tive application of new law to pending litigation and bars against relit-
igating final decisions subject to discarded law.  Stare decisis safe-
guards the public’s reliance interest in the present law, but 
retroactivity frustrates the same interests for pending litigants.  Stare 
decisis similarly safeguards the public’s interest in intertemporal 
equality before the law, but the bar on relitigating final decisions 
frustrates this interest for parties subject to a final judgment.  In tan-
dem, these doctrines seem to present something of a paradox.  If all 
litigants should be subject to the law at the time of the alleged harm, 
then courts should not apply new rules retroactively to pending liti-
 
224 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers was not correct when it was 
decided, and it is not correct today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent.  Bowers v. 
Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”). 
225 See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing:  The Myth of Adjudicative Retro-
activity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (1999) (“The concept of retroactivity is a relative 
newcomer to our jurisprudence.”). 
226 See id. at 1082–83 (describing how the consequence of the declaratory theory of the law is 
to eschew the concept of retroactivity). 
227 For a discussion of habeas in the early republic, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law 
and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465–74 (1963). 
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gants.  If all litigants should be subject to the correct law, then courts 
should not bar reopening suits by those previously subject to the in-
correct law. 
This paradox did not take shape in the American legal mind until 
the mid-twentieth century.228  Two common law forces obscured it 
from view.  First, the notion that the common law represented an un-
changing force discerned by the courts rendered a distinction be-
tween old law and new law nonsensical.  Reliance interests notwith-
standing, courts could not apply a past, mistaken view of the law to 
pending litigants.  If they did, courts would be allowing those litigants 
to evade the law.229  Second, common law constraints on collateral re-
view removed most prior litigants from intertemporal concern.  With 
habeas review limited to jurisdictional questions, courts did not face 
the issue of what substantive law should have applied to past deci-
sions.  New pronouncements about the law of jurisdiction would have 
applied to habeas petitioners, but such changes were relatively rare 
compared to changes in substantive law.230 
As each of these forces shifted over time, so did views of retroactiv-
ity.  If the law could change, it might make sense to honor reliance 
interests and apply the law at the time of the harm.  With broader 
habeas review, moreover, it became thinkable that a court might 
break open a final judgment on the basis of the merits.  The Supreme 
Court took up precisely these possibilities in the 1965 case Linkletter v. 
Walker.231  In Linkletter, a habeas petitioner sought to invoke a broader 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule adopted by the Court after his 
conviction became final.  The Court held that new law applies to cas-
es on direct review and that new law also may apply to cases on collat-
eral review, subject to considerations of fairness and policy.  Per Jus-
tice Clark, the Court created a three-factor test for said 
considerations:  whether retrospective application would further the 
purpose of the invoked rule, the level of reliance placed upon the 
prior rule, and the effect of retrospective application on the admin-
istration of justice.232 
 
228 For an overview of early discussions of the issue, see Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurispru-
dence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–21 (1960). 
229 That is, at common law, the past, mistaken law was simply not the law. 
230 Notably, however, an individual convicted under a statute later deemed unconstitutional 
could bring a habeas petition for that reason in the early years of the Republic.  Bator, 
supra note 227, at 471.  As Bator writes, “In an era when law was not ‘made’ but ‘found,’ 
unconstitutional statutes were thought of as ‘void,’ as nonexistent, in a rather literal way:  
they created no law at all.”  Id. 
231 381 U.S. 618 (1965). 
232 Id. at 629. 
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The Linkletter decision garnered widespread criticism.233  Initially, 
the Court extended the decision’s retroactivity analysis to habeas re-
view and some portions of civil actions.234  Linkletter’s three-factor test 
would govern retroactive application of new law for each cause of ac-
tion.  Ultimately, however, the decision and its progeny would repre-
sent a temporary departure from the common law approach to retro-
activity.  Behind a series of dissents by Justice Harlan, the Court 
reversed course.235  In the criminal and then civil contexts, it aban-
doned the Linkletter factors for cases on direct review.236  Whereas the-
se decisions established a hard rule in favor of retroactivity on direct 
review, the Court effectively established a hard rule against retroactiv-
ity on collateral review.  Once again abandoning the Linkletter factors, 
the Court recognized two narrow exceptions to the rule against ret-
roactivity governing habeas petitions.237 
Upon recognizing the paradox in common law retroactivity doc-
trine, the Supreme Court first eliminated it and then reintroduced it.  
The Court’s rationale for eliminating the paradox turned on an aspi-
ration for both correct decisions and intertemporal equality among 
litigants.  True constitutional meaning, it reasoned, should be ap-
plied to all litigants before the courts.238  The Linkletter factors, howev-
 
233 See, e.g., Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity:  A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. 
L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1975) (observing that “[c]ommentators have had a veritable field day 
with” the Linkletter test); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process:  A Reply 
to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 720 (1966) (arguing that “all newly declared 
constitutional rights should be given retroactive effect”). 
234 See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 100 (1971) (extending a variant of the Linklet-
ter analysis to a civil case to determine the retroactive applicability of a Supreme Court 
decision concerning the applicability of state statutes of limitations under federal law); 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 294 (1967) (extending the Linkletter analysis to habeas pe-
titions). 
235 For a description of Justice Harlan’s role in this reversal, see Roosevelt, supra note 225, at 
1093–97. 
236 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993) (extending the rule in Griffith 
to all civil cases); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987) (holding that “failure to 
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on direct review vio-
lates basic norms of constitutional adjudication”). 
237 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989).  The Court made two exceptions to this 
rule.  First, new rules should be applied retroactively if they place “primary, private indi-
vidual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.”  Id. 
(quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)).  Second, new rules of crimi-
nal procedure should be applied retroactively if they are “implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty” and contribute to the accuracy of the verdict.  Id. at 311–12 (quoting 
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693). 
238 In exposing the fiction that the overruled decision must “be only a failure at true discov-
ery and was consequently never the law,” Linkletter aspired to devise a system that applied 
the proper law in a given case, whether it be a notion of the law since abandoned or a no-
tion of the law rejecting some past notion of the law.  Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 623. 
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er, set limits on the applicability of true constitutional meaning.  The 
Court’s test promised intertemporal equality, but it raised the possi-
bility of applying visions of the Constitution rooted in falsehood.  
Although the Court in Linkletter focused on questions of purpose and 
reliance, the third factor, concerning administration, loomed large.  
If the Court had found that the habeas petitioner in Linkletter could 
apply the new law, it would have faced thousands of similar petitions.  
It is not surprising that the Court ruled the other way.239 
The Court did not view its subsequent retreat from Linkletter as re-
introducing the paradox described above.  Rather, it denied the 
presence of the paradox in the first place.  Behind Justice Harlan, the 
Court revived an earlier, narrower vision of habeas that would not 
permit courts to reassess most constitutional claims on collateral re-
view.240  Under this view, habeas petitioners may invoke subsequent 
decisions only rarely.  Parties on direct review, by contrast, may not 
justify departures from the mandates of the Constitution by virtue of 
reliance interests.  Accordingly, the Court’s reversal reinstated a 
common law notion of retroactivity; intertemporal concerns about 
equality between prior litigants and present or future litigants seldom 
arise because habeas seldom implicates substantive constitutional 
questions.  When habeas does implicate substantive constitutional 
questions, the Court has rarely allowed retroactive application of the 
law.241 
Both of the Court’s approaches contravene the Enlightenment 
ideal.  Consider first the Linkletter regime.  The Court’s three-factor 
test allowed concerns about reliance interests and administrative 
burdens to outweigh constitutional truth.  That is, for cases on direct 
and collateral review, Linkletter justified the continued application of 
law deemed to be riddled with mythology and disjunction.  Now, con-
sider the post-Linkletter regime.  Although parties on direct review are 
subject to true constitutional meaning, those on collateral review re-
main, with few exceptions, bound by law once again riddled with my-
thology and disjunction.  Whether a reviewing court views its role as 
 
239 See Roosevelt, supra note 225, at 1091 (describing the Linkletter result as “almost inevita-
ble” because otherwise there would have been “an avalanche of habeas petitions and new 
trials”). 
240 For an overview of the tightening of habeas jurisdiction since the 1970s, see Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence:  The Attraction and Limitations of the 
Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
587, 609–18 (2005). 
241 For a postmortem on the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence in cases where habeas peti-
tioners sought to apply new rules of criminal procedure, see Note, Rethinking Retroactivity, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1652–56 (2005). 
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engaging the constitutional merits or addressing narrower jurisdic-
tional issues, petitioners must endure a legal standard recognized as 
incorrect.242  Res judicata requirements, moreover, preserve prior de-
cisions based on mistaken views. 
It may seem odd to imagine that the courts could reverse final civ-
il judgments on the basis of changed understandings of constitutional 
meaning.  Yet a commitment to eschew mythology and disjunction 
would not require that the courts retroactively apply all new under-
standings of constitutional truth.  Depending on one’s view from Si-
nai, constitutional meaning might legitimately change over time; if 
that were so, both the law applied in prior cases and the law applied 
in current cases would be correct.  The cases at issue here are those 
in which a new understanding of constitutional truth casts doubt on 
their propriety as decided.  Even for this smaller set of cases, the ad-
ministrative burdens of reopening final judgments would be enor-
mous.  Surely, moreover, at some point we may prefer that the law be 
final rather than correct;243 uncertainty hinders our ability to plan for 
the future in both personal dealings and economic enterprises. 
For the Enlightenment ideal, however, these are secondary con-
cerns at best.  The tenets of Enlightenment do not permit departures 
from true constitutional meaning, convenient or otherwise.  Yet ret-
roactivity doctrine has accepted such departures as a matter of con-
venience, perhaps even of necessity.  Suppose that the Framers con-
sidered res judicata and non-retroactivity for collateral attack a vital 
piece of their constitutional mechanism.  This does not change the 
fact that in many cases, these doctrines undermine the Enlighten-
ment project of eschewing mythology and disjunction.  Although 
non-retroactivity does not obstruct efforts to realize constitutional 
truth in future decisions, it preserves the interpretive failures that af-
flicted the past.  In so doing, it gives past mythology and disjunction 
continued influence in the future. 
D.  Dicta and Writing Separately 
The preceding common law doctrines each preserve mythology 
and disjunction in constitutional adjudication.  The structure of 
common law judicial decisions, moreover, institutionalizes and legit-
imates those forces.  This Part focuses on two common law phenom-
 
242 That is, a legal standard recognized as incorrect within a given constitutional theory. 
243 As Justice Jackson eloquently put this preference, “[w]e are not final because we are infal-
lible, but we are infallible only because we are final.”  Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 
(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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ena that illustrate this point:  (1) the distinction between holding and 
dicta, and (2) the practice of writing separately.  Although common 
law courts were ostensibly called upon to decide the legal issues nec-
essary to resolve the dispute at hand, they often reached other issues 
as well.244  Courts composed of more than one judge, moreover, spoke 
in more than one voice; common law practice allowed each judge to 
deliver his opinion.245  Under the rule of stare decisis, both practices 
required subsequent courts to distinguish between binding law and 
merely instructive statements. 
Each of these decisional doctrines has long been a part of our 
constitutional structure.  Begin with writing separately.  In the Early 
Republic, Chief Justice Marshall labored to eliminate the English 
practice of judicial opinions issued ad seriatim, consistently delivering 
decisions for a unanimous Court.246  He proved unable to cement this 
practice in the face of public criticism and dissenting justices, per-
haps most notably Justice Johnson.247  In the years hence, separate 
opinions have been a consistent presence in judicial practice.  Unlike 
their English predecessors, however, American courts have followed 
Marshall’s call for a consistent judicial voice.  When composed of 
multiple members, courts aspire to produce a single opinion for a 
majority.248  Plurality opinions garner consistent criticism.249  It is ac-
cepted, though, that single members of the court may write separate-
ly to concur or dissent in the reasoning or the result. 
The distinction between holding and dicta recognized by Ameri-
can courts has similarly deep roots.  In theory, the doctrine of stare 
decisis could call upon courts to defer, in the sense described above, 
to all legal conclusions reached by prior courts.  At common law, 
however, stare decisis only attached to those conclusions essential to 
 
244 Indeed, the emergence of a distinction between holding and dicta illustrates that courts 
often opined on matters subsequent courts would deem inessential. 
245 See M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again:  A Theory of Dissent, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292–303 (describing the British and early American practice of 
delivering judgments seriatim). 
246 For an overview of Chief Justice Marshall’s effort in this regard, see Charles F. Hobson, 
Defining the Office:  John Marshall as Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1442–50 (2006). 
247 See generally PERCIVAL E. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT:  A CHRONOLOGY 20–40 
(1969). 
248 In recent years, for example, Chief Justice Roberts has invoked the practice of the Mar-
shall Court in asserting that his fellow Justices “should all be worried, when they’re writ-
ing separately, about the effect on the Court as an institution.”  JEFFREY ROSEN, THE 
SUPREME COURT:  THE PERSONALITIES AND RIVALRIES THAT DEFINED AMERICA 7–8 (2006). 
249 For an extreme view, see, for example, John F. Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Crip-
ples:  Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, 1974 DUKE L.J. 59, 86 (stating that the “evil in-
herent in decision by plurality is not a minor one”). 
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the elements of a prior decision reached by a majority of the court.250  
In a regime governed by seriatim opinions, the task of distinguishing 
holding from dicta requires a careful reading of each of the opinions 
issued by the court.  Plurality opinions require modern courts to en-
gage in this type of analysis, but majority opinions make dividing 
holding from dicta more straightforward.  The presumption against 
seriatim practice in our constitutional regime helps ease the task of 
distinguishing the essential elements of a decision from the inessen-
tial elements.251 
Both of these common law forces envision legal interpretation as 
an iterative and uncertain enterprise.  In a sense, the distinction be-
tween holding and dicta combines the rationales underlying justicia-
bility doctrine and stare decisis.  Although courts are bound by past 
decisions, they are only bound by those elements of past decisions 
thought to be within the bounds of judicial competence.252  That is, 
courts defer to past decisions only insofar as they resolve a confined 
and concrete dispute.  The distinction between holding and dicta 
valorizes the notion that the law contains vast tracts of uncharted ter-
ritory.  Courts may opine about the contours of the law governing ab-
stract disputes, but their opining does not bind with the force of law.  
The true content of the law, then, comes into view gradually but nev-
er completely.  The path to that content is borne of restraint; no 
court may bind all others with its vision of true legal meaning.253 
The practice of writing separately reinforces the value of iteration 
and uncertainty expressed in the distinction between holding and 
dicta.  In a practical sense, signed opinions may improve the judicial 
work product by making judges accountable for their work.254  More 
 
250 Although the definition of dicta may be simply stated, what constitutes an “essential” part 
of the prior decision is subject to serious debate.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell 
Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005) (providing a comprehensive frame-
work for distinguishing holding from dicta); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1997, 1998 (1994) (discussing the “jurisprudential implications of Article III 
for determining how federal courts ought to distinguish between the holdings and dicta 
of past cases”). 
251 Of course, this presumption can only get us so far.  We still encounter elaborately frac-
tured opinions upon occasion.  Consider, for example, the multiple majorities present in 
Regents of the Univ.of Cal.v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
252 See Dorf, supra note 250, at 2053 (arguing that the distinction between holding and dicta 
helps “confin[e] the lawmaking authority of the courts to areas of their institutional 
competence”). 
253 For an articulation of this view, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term—
Foreword:  Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 35–36 (1996). 
254 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 139 (1990) 
(“Disclosure of votes and opinion writers may nourish a judge’s ego, his or her sense of 
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commonly, however, defenders of the practice invoke the power of 
separate opinions to promote judicial dialogue.  To be persuasive, 
majority opinions must grapple with competing views.  A majority of 
the court, moreover, may be willing to temper its decision to avoid 
the cloud of concurrence or dissent.255  The practice of writing sepa-
rately does not only promote dialogue in individual cases; it also 
promotes dialogue between courts over time.  In many cases, concur-
rences and dissents call upon future courts to cast aside stare decisis 
and correct the majority’s departure from the true path.  The law 
may be wrong today, but through iteration, it can work itself clean.256 
Though ubiquitous, neither of these common law traditions has 
garnered universal acclaim.  Criticism of the distinction between 
holding and dicta invariably turns to criticism of stare decisis.  I am 
unaware of any scholars who contend that common law courts should 
afford equal deference to holding and dicta.  To afford such defer-
ence to dicta would render present courts beholden to the whims of 
prior courts.257  Rather, scholars tend to criticize the prevalence of 
dicta in judicial opinions.  Regardless of one’s definition of dicta, it is 
often difficult to distinguish in practice between necessary and extra-
neous elements of a judicial decision.  A liberal disposition toward 
dicta, therefore, poses two dangers.  First, it may allow courts to ob-
scure the true grounds of a legal decision.258  Second, it may mislead 
subsequent courts into misstating and misapplying the law.259  Both of 
these concerns call for minimal use of dicta rather than its abandon-
ment. 
 
individuality; but if our system affords the judge personal satisfaction, it also serves to 
hold the individual judge accountable.”). 
255 See William J. Brennan, Jr., In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 430 (1986) (“[T]he 
dissent is often more than just a plea; it safeguards the integrity of the judicial decision-
making process by keeping the majority accountable for the rationale and consequences 
of its decision.”). 
256 See id. at 432 (describing how Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy “spoke not only to his 
peers, but to his society, and, more important, across time to later generations”). 
257 Of course, civil courts afford equal deference to holding and dicta in that they afford no 
precedential value to either.  See MERRYMAN, supra note 184, at 48–51 (observing that, in 
contrast to common law systems, certainty in civil-law systems may not be achieved “by giv-
ing force of law to judicial decisions”).  The point here is that once we afford deference 
to prior decisions, a “first in time” rule for judicial pronouncements could encourage 
judges to decide issues merely to bind their colleagues. 
258 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:  Judicial Writings, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1411 (1995) (“[T]he core ruling of an opinion can be obscured or bur-
ied in too much talk, not keyed directly into the holding [itself].”). 
259 See Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Administrative Law, 67 YALE L.J. 240, 
249 (1957) (noting the “proclivity of ambitious dicta to mislead rather than illuminate”). 
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Separate opinions have received more trenchant criticism.  Much 
like liberal use of dicta, seriatim opinions obscure the rationale gov-
erning a particular case and increase the likelihood that subsequent 
courts will reach a mistaken view of the law.260  The single judicial 
voice found in civil-law traditions promotes a view of the law as de-
terminate and uncontroversial.  Separate opinions dramatize the pos-
sibility that reasonable minds may differ on legal meaning.  This may 
be desirable for promoting dialogue about law.261  However, the splin-
tering of a court invites comparisons between law and politics.  As the 
Supreme Court reverses and re-reverses itself in opinions distinguish-
able only by the Court’s membership, one may begin to doubt that 
true legal meaning exists at all.262  At the least, the fact that a concur-
rence or dissent may be vindicated down the road indicates that the 
prevailing view of legal meaning may be leading us astray.263 
Consider these criticisms in the language of mythology and dis-
junction.  The distinction between holding and dicta acknowledges 
that courts may stray from our visions of true constitutional meaning.  
Of course, the distinction seeks to insulate future decisions from this 
outcome.  Yet the acceptance of dicta in the first place legitimates 
mythology and disjunction.  Even though it is not governing law, dic-
ta may introduce misunderstanding into the stream of the law.  Dicta 
may obscure mythology and disjunction within an opinion, and it 
may promote such mythology and disjunction in succeeding opin-
ions. Surely, dicta may clarify the law, even if it is not itself the law.  
Moreover, the nature of legal exposition makes it difficult to imagine 
that each thought in an opinion could be necessary to the holding.  
Yet the role of dicta in our constitutional order goes far beyond these 
justifications. 
The practice of writing separately also acknowledges that courts 
may stray from true constitutional meaning.  When a plurality opin-
 
260 See Henderson, supra note 245, at 298–99 (discussing the propensity for confusion that 
accompanies seriatim practice). 
261 See generally Kevin M. Stack, Note, The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 
2235 (1996) (asserting that the practice of writing dissents can be justified on the 
grounds of political legitimacy). 
262 In this sense, even a single fractured decision, like Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), has 
the power to seriously damage the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court.  See Jack 
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 
1450–58 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore could harm the Court’s legitimacy in the short-
term, but that the Court would probably recover in the long-term). 
263 The “great dissenter” is a recurrent figure in our constitutional story; constitutional 
wrong-turns enter something of a constitutional “anti-canon,” whereas dissents warning of 
the wrong-turn enter the canon.  See generally Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and 
Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243 (1998) (discussing the “canonization” of dissents). 
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ion obscures the holding of a case or yields mistaken views of the law 
in subsequent cases, it advances mythology and disjunction.  When a 
court issues a majority opinion, separate opinions often charge that 
the majority opinion rests on mythology and disjunction.  In such in-
stances, separate opinions cannot introduce disjunction; they are not 
binding law.  They may, however, introduce mythology that produces 
disjunction in a subsequent case.  Separate opinions may also high-
light that some members of a court subscribe to mythology that 
would produce disjunction if given legal effect.  Indeed, the separate 
opinion institutionalizes recognition that the current law may rest on 
mythology and disjunction.  In seeking to perfect the law of tomor-
row, separate opinions raise doubts about the law of today. 
To the extent that separate opinions and dicta generate dialogue 
about true constitutional meaning, they might reduce the prevalence 
of mythology and disjunction on net.  Perhaps more importantly, 
however, the two common law practices expose mythology and dis-
junction enshrined by justiciability doctrine, stare decisis, retroactivity 
doctrine, and the like.  In this sense, separate opinions and dicta 
highlight the distance between the Enlightenment ideal and the 
common law reality of our constitutional system.  This does not mean 
that we recognize that distance; we may tell ourselves that the present 
mythologies and disjunctions are merely temporary departures from 
the truth.  Yet it is out in the open for all to see. 
IV.  THE CULTURE AND THE IDEAL 
In the last two Parts, I identified two strands of our constitutional 
discourse.  First, I argued that constitutional theorists speak in the 
language of the Enlightenment ideal.  That is, they condemn my-
thology and disjunction in an effort to discern constitutional truth 
and translate it into constitutional meaning.  Second, I argued that 
constitutional theorists inhabit a constitutional system long pervaded 
by the common law culture.  That system is quite opposed to the ten-
ets of the Enlightenment ideal; it accepts mythology and disjunction 
as necessary elements of legal order.  It follows that constitutional 
rhetoric about mythology and disjunction does not match the reality 
of constitutional practice.  Or, to put the point another way, the En-
lightenment ideal is itself a form of mythology. 
In this Part, I outline three ways in which we might address the 
tension between the Enlightenment ideal and the common law cul-
ture.  First, we might embrace one strand at the expense of the other.  
Call this the path of absolutism.  Second, we might consciously reject 
each strand in favor of a hybrid of the two.  Call this the path of rec-
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onciliation.  Third, we might preserve a state of conflict like that pre-
sent in the status quo.  Call this the path of contradiction.  I argue 
that constitutional scholars almost uniformly choose the path of con-
tradiction; they espouse both the Enlightenment ideal and the com-
mon law culture without acknowledging or resolving the tension be-
tween them.  Those who purport to follow the path of absolutism are 
not faithful to it, and followers of the path of reconciliation are few 
and far between. 
A.  The Path of Absolutism 
A few scholars purport to follow the path of absolutism to either 
the common law culture or the Enlightenment ideal.  In this Subpart, 
I examine two of the scholars most faithful to the path of absolutism 
in modern constitutional discourse:  Ronald Dworkin and Cass Sun-
stein.  Dworkin’s notion of law as integrity flows in most regards from 
the Enlightenment ideal.  Sunstein’s notion of judicial minimalism 
captures the core of the common law culture.  As we will see, even 
these exemplars of the absolutist path are not quite absolutist in their 
adherence to either the common law culture or the Enlightenment 
ideal.  Like other scholars inclined toward absolutism, Dworkin and 
Sunstein occupy the fringe of constitutional discourse, albeit an oft-
discussed fringe. 
Begin with Dworkin.  In many ways, Dworkin’s notion of constitu-
tionalism echoes the Enlightenment project championed by the 
Framers.  The task of the interpreter is to uncover the natural consti-
tution of the political body.  Or, to use Dworkin’s words, the task for 
the interpreter is to divine “the principles of justice, fairness, and 
procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpreta-
tion of the community’s legal practice.”264  The range of permissible 
interpretations, however, is limited by familiar constraints.  First, the 
interpreter must arrive at constitutional meaning from first principles 
rather than policy or intuition.265  Second, the interpreter may only 
reach first principles that “fit” the facts that underlie her legal or-
der.266  Third, the route to principle as opposed to policy rests in a 
 
264 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225. 
265 For a discussion of this distinction, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82–
88 (1977). 
266 Dworkin introduces this concept in the context of constitutional adjudication.  See id. at 
106 (arguing that an interpreter must look to constitutional rules and settled practices to 
see which of a set of competing constitutional theories “provides a smoother fit with the 
constitutional scheme as a whole”).  For a general discussion, see DWORKIN, Law’s 
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test of coherence, or what Dworkin has called “articulate consisten-
cy.”267  Let us unpack these three requirements further. 
Dworkin’s effort to distinguish between policy and principle re-
calls Wechsler’s aspiration for neutral principles of constitutional law.  
Whereas arguments of policy seek to protect a “collective goal of the 
community as a whole,” arguments of principle demonstrate that a 
decision “secures some individual or group right.”268  The latter form 
of argument can only succeed when “the principle cited can be 
shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted, and with 
decisions that the institution is prepared to make in . . . hypothetical 
circumstances.”269  Dworkin’s Hercules must begin this project anew 
with each dispute before him; the pursuit of first principles never 
ceases.  Of course, a perpetual return to first principles begs the ques-
tion of constraint.  An interpreter might encounter a plethora of via-
ble first principles.  Dworkin’s initial response lies in morality; the in-
terpreter, he says, is to justify our legal order so that it is best.270 
Surely, abstract morality is not much of a constraint.  Beneath 
Dworkin’s appeal to morality, however, rests a set of more specific re-
quirements concerning factual accuracy and conceptual coherence.  
As to fact, Dworkin requires that interpretive conclusions follow from 
the facts underlying the interpreter’s political community.  Hercules 
may not impose upon that community his own view of a desirable 
constitutional order; his theory must justify existing “political history” 
and perpetuate existing “community morality.”271  As to coherence, 
Dworkin reads a requirement of global coherence into his notion of 
first principles.  Each decision must be consistent with a “comprehen-
 
EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 227–28 (“History matters because that scheme of principle must 
justify the standing as well as the content of these past decisions.”). 
267 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 88 (arguing that consistency 
“means consistency in the application of the principle relied upon, not merely in the ap-
plication of the particular rule announced in the name of that principle”). 
268 Id. at 82. 
269 Id. at 88. 
270 See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225–27 (laying out Dworkin’s theory of “law 
as integrity,” which “insists that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore 
combine backward-and-forward-looking elements; they interpret contemporary legal 
practice seen as an unfolding political narrative”); DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 
44, at 7–12 (asserting that a “moral reading asks [judges] to find the best conception of 
constitutional moral principles”).  “According to law as integrity,” Dworkin writes, “prop-
ositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, 
and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the 
community’s legal practice.”  DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 225. 
271 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 113, 125–26. 
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sive theory” of the law, a “seamless web” of legal meaning.272  This is a 
broad requirement; Hercules must uncover principles “that fit, not 
only the particular precedent to which some litigant directs his atten-
tion,” but all other judicial decisions and statutes in his jurisdiction 
“so far as these must be seen to be generated by principle rather than 
policy.”273 
In some realms, Dworkin’s theory eschews the mythology and dis-
junction of the common law culture.  Take precedent.  For Dworkin, 
interpreters must account for past decisions in their efforts to divine 
a coherent legal system.  Past decisions, however, do not bind inter-
preters in the manner of common law stare decisis.  Precedent in-
forms interpretive efforts to ensure consistency and coherence; it 
does not foreclose inquiries into legal meaning.274  Dworkin argues 
that a theory that “designates part of what is to be justified as mistak-
en is prima facie weaker than one that does not.”275  It follows that 
Hercules must show that an interpretive theory that casts past deci-
sions as mistaken “is nevertheless a stronger justification than any al-
ternative that does not recognize any mistakes, or that recognizes a 
different set of mistakes.”276  In this sense, precedent checks the per-
sonal convictions of the interpreter, but not her inquiry into first 
principles, factual accuracy, and structural coherence. 
In other realms, however, Dworkin’s theory leaves open the possi-
bility of mythology and disjunction.  Hercules would probably decry 
much of justiciability doctrine as unprincipled, but Dworkin does not 
engage the topic.  He emphasizes that judges must respect institu-
tional role, but it is not clear whether that role incorporates a com-
mon law notion of adjudication.  Dworkin implies that it does, noting 
that Hercules must sometimes accept “substantive inconsistency to 
keep faith with more procedural principles” given the “complex 
character of adjudication.”277 Dicta and the practice of writing sepa-
rately seemingly raise the same possibility, yet Dworkin also does not 
engage them overtly.  In the case of retroactivity, Dworkin is a more 
explicit apologist for mythology and disjunction.  He claims that law 
 
272 Id. at 87, 116. Given the difficulty of this task, Dworkin quips, “You will now see why I 
called our judge Hercules.”  Id. at 116. 
273 Id. 
274 In perhaps the most prominent discussion of the place of precedent in his theory, 
Dworkin analogizes the judge to the writer of a chapter in a chain novel.  See DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 228–38. 
275 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 265, at 122. 
276 Id. 
277 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 46, at 402. 
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as integrity dictates that decisions are correct as decided and thereby 
ignores whether they should ever be revisited.278 
Let us turn to Sunstein.  Whereas Dworkin exalts theory, Sunstein 
exalts what we might call anti-theory.  For him, the task of interpreta-
tion is not one driven by the promise of first principles or a particular 
type of constitutional clarity.  The “judicial mind,” he argues, “natu-
rally gravitates away from abstractions and toward close encounters 
with particular cases.”279  Sunstein has set out to legitimate that dispo-
sition, which he locates within the common law tradition.  Like Ed-
mund Burke, with whom Sunstein has identified in recent years,280 he 
has developed something of a theory against theory.  His argument 
does not exhibit the structural coherence of Dworkin’s.  Rather, Sun-
stein’s defense of “judicial minimalism” represents a collection of 
pragmatic considerations oriented toward stability and order.281  The 
result is an embrace of elements of the common law culture and deri-
sion for abstraction in constitutionalism. 
Sunstein’s approach to constitutionalism echoes Bickel’s, but it 
exhibits important differences.  Whereas Bickel envisioned the Su-
preme Court as uniquely capable of advancing principle, Sunstein 
distrusts the notion of principle in judicial interpretation.282  For Sun-
stein, judicial appeals to principle threaten democratic choice, the 
institutional capacities of courts, and social stability more broadly.  
Sunstein argues that courts should only decide issues necessary to re-
solve a case or controversy, and they should justify their decisions 
with as little abstraction as possible.283  To use Sunstein’s terms, judi-
 
278 For a discussion of the implications of Dworkin’s theory on retroactivity, see generally 
Kenneth J. Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories:  Dworkin’s Rights Thesis, Retroactivi-
ty, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 369 (1984). 
279 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at 
xi (1999). 
280 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006) (defend-
ing a Burkean approach to constitutional interpretation that he argues is both rooted in 
our constitutional system and desirable in instances when originalism produces intolera-
ble results, established traditions are just, and judicial competence is limited). 
281 Sunstein acknowledges, however, that this pragmatism cannot be fully divorced from the-
ory, as “the strongest defenses of judicial minimalism must themselves be theoretical in 
character.” SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 248. 
282 According to Sunstein, “Bickel erred in seeing the Court as having a systemically better 
understanding of ‘principle,’ than other branches.”  Id. at 267 n.5. 
283 Sunstein argues that incompletely theorized agreements “are especially well suited to the 
institutional limits of the judiciary, which is composed, in significant part, of multi-
member bodies, consisting in turn of highly diverse people who must render many deci-
sions, live together, avoid error to the extent possible, and show each other mutual re-
spect.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1738 
(1995). 
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cial decisions usually should be shallow rather than deep and narrow 
rather than wide.284  Together, these guidelines leave questions of 
principle to democratic processes, confine judicial inquiry to a man-
ageable scope, and avoid the divisiveness and turmoil that often ac-
companies assertions of first principles.285 
Although Sunstein attacks reasoning from first principles, he does 
not single out the remaining two tenets of the Enlightenment ideal 
for criticism.  Indeed, his attack on first principles derives its force 
from claims that courts construct a more coherent and factually 
based constitutional order when they eschew abstraction.  Confined 
judicial inquiries, he argues, ensure that decisions are grounded care-
fully in facts.286  Limits on abstraction, he argues, ensure that deci-
sions are consistent with the body of existing law.287  Yet, in preaching 
against theory and breadth, Sunstein implicitly defends some inci-
dence of mythology and disjunction.  In leaving things undecided, 
courts preserve mythologies that underlie prevailing constitutional 
practice.  In avoiding abstractions, courts evade inquiries that may re-
veal mythology.  For Sunstein, then, pragmatic concerns suggest that 
we allow some past falsehoods to persist into the present.288 
The tools of Sunstein’s judicial minimalism are those of the com-
mon law culture.  Sunstein does not derive these tools from scratch; 
rather, he accepts them as the substance of our legal order.  His no-
tion that courts should leave things undecided incorporates the 
common law case-or-controversy requirement enshrined in justiciabil-
ity doctrine.289  Stare decisis governs Sunstein’s approach to shallow 
and narrow decisions; the allure of not deciding rests in that we 
“must take precedents as fixed points” in our constitutional system.290  
Sunstein does not engage retroactivity doctrine, yet it is equally cen-
tral in his conception of constitutional interpretation; once cases are 
decided, they become the fixed points of precedent, not to be revisit-
ed except under extraordinary circumstances.  The practices of writ-
 
284 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 14–22.  Sunstein does not argue that 
shallowness and depth are always appropriate, but he argues for a strong presumption in 
its favor. 
285 See id. at 46–54. 
286 See id. at 252–55 (arguing that “an assessment of facts may well aid in the achievement of 
incompletely theorized agreements,” which may “be shallow when they are a product of 
an understanding of facts”). 
287 See id. at 255–58. 
288 As Sunstein acknowledges, “If the concern is not the process but the substance—getting 
democracy’s content right—it is possible that judicial minimalism will be all wrong.”  Id. 
at 55. 
289 Id. at 39–40. 
290 Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 283, at 1761. 
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ing separately and distinguishing holding and dicta, moreover, re-
ceive particular emphasis in Sunstein’s account.  These practices, he 
argues, function to both highlight deviant judicial overstep and con-
tain its effects moving forward.291 
Like Dworkin, however, Sunstein does not fully commit to an ab-
solutist vision.  He seeks “a presumption rather than a taboo against 
high-level theorization.”292  It is not quite clear when Sunstein would 
allow courts to turn to first principles.  He argues that “fuller theori-
zation—in the form of wider and deeper inquiry into the grounds for 
legal judgment—may be valuable or even necessary to prevent incon-
sistency, bias, or self-interest.”293  Recently, Sunstein has argued that 
courts should neither follow a Burkean commitment to tradition nor 
follow a rationalist skepticism of tradition.294  Surely, these claims are 
not entirely at odds with traditional common law interpretation; 
common law courts change course and synthesize bodies of legal doc-
trine.  Sunstein accepts, however, limits on minimalism that recall the 
Enlightenment ideal.  He defends an interpretive method that allows 
mythology and disjunction, but he also defends departures from that 
method for the purpose of eschewing mythology and disjunction. 
B.  The Path of Reconciliation 
As we have seen, Dworkin and Sunstein stray from the path of ab-
solutism.  Although both scholars elevate either the common law cul-
ture or the Enlightenment ideal, neither elevates his preferred intel-
lectual strand to the complete exclusion of the other intellectual 
strand.  In so doing, both Dworkin and Sunstein follow one of the 
paths competing with absolutism.  Sunstein follows the path of rec-
onciliation.  His approach to constitutional interpretation self-
consciously blends elements of the common law culture and the En-
lightenment ideal.  Dworkin, by contrast, follows the path of contra-
diction.  His approach to constitutionalism blends elements of the 
common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, but claims that it 
does not.  Let us first consider reconciliation. 
The idea that we might reconcile the common law culture and the 
Enlightenment ideal may seem perplexing.  Whereas the Enlighten-
 
291 Sunstein singles out the distinction between holding and dicta in his discussion of mini-
malism.  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 4–5. 
292 Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, supra note 283, at 1767. 
293 Id. at 1750. 
294 See generally Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, supra note 280 (asserting that Burkean mini-
malism may not be appropriate in the context of constitutional law and should be reject-
ed when traditions are discriminatory). 
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ment ideal disallows mythology and disjunction, the common law cul-
ture allows them.  How can these two strands possibly be reconciled?  
Two possibilities come to mind.  First, we might segment them.  That 
is, we might follow the common law culture in some areas of the law 
and follow the Enlightenment ideal in other areas.295  This approach 
would allow mythology and disjunction, but it would cabin the reach 
of the common law culture.  Second, and more counter-intuitively, 
we might combine them.  That is, we might believe that adherence to 
the Enlightenment ideal requires adherence to the common law cul-
ture.  This approach would allow some mythology and disjunction, 
but only to further a longer-term project of eschewing deeper my-
thologies and disjunctions. 
Take first the approach of self-consciously employing the Enlight-
enment ideal and the common law culture in different segments in 
our legal order.  This is Sunstein’s approach to reconciliation.  Sun-
stein argues that constitutional interpretation should be narrow and 
shallow, but he labors to define situations in which width and depth 
are appropriate.296  This is an argument for a flexible adherence to 
common law mechanisms that allows the Enlightenment ideal to 
trump upon occasion.  David Strauss provides a second example of 
this flavor of reconciliation.  Strauss argues that the common law 
method defines the contours of our constitutional system, but only 
up to a point.  The constitutional text, he argues, grounds constitu-
tional discourse in both some notion of principle and some level of 
concreteness.  For Strauss, the text “serves as a convention, a focal 
point of agreement” within the chaos of the accumulated wisdom le-
gitimated by the common law method.297  Accordingly, his account 
balances invocations of principle and common law appeals to settled 
practice. 
 
295 Indeed, the law is not quite as far from this state of affairs as it may seem at first glance.  
Antitrust law, for example, is something of an island of the Enlightenment ideal.  See, e.g., 
Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and Antitrust at the Millen-
nium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 187 (2000) (arguing that antitrust law nimbly returns to 
questions of economic first principle rather than taking a “wooden approach” to econom-
ic reasoning). 
296 See SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 57 (arguing that “it is worthwhile to 
attempt a broad and deep solution (1) when judges have considerable confidence in the 
merits of that solution, (2) when the solution can reduce costly uncertainty for future 
courts and litigants, (3) when advance planning is important, and (4) when a maximalist 
approach will promote democratic goals either by creating the preconditions for democ-
racy or by imposing good incentives on elected officials”). 
297 David Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 
1732 (2003). 
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Now, take the approach of combining the ideal and the culture.  
The leading proponent of this view is Bickel.  For Bickel, the com-
mon law culture enables the Supreme Court to safeguard aspirations 
of Enlightenment.  Bickel would not have framed his views this way; 
like Sunstein, he ultimately grounded his constitutional theory in 
Burkeanism.298  In The Least Dangerous Branch, however, Bickel did not 
disclaim a place for the tenets of Enlightenment.  Instead, he argued 
that the pursuit of principle must fail if it is a slave to itself.299  Bickel’s 
famous “passive virtues” describe a form of adherence to common law 
instruments of minimalism.300  While these instruments are “not 
themselves principled,” Bickel argues, they allow the Court to render 
“principled adjudications” when it chooses to decide.301  Prudence, 
not principle, must determine the path of adjudication; principle is a 
“universal guide,” but it is not a “universal constraint.”302  To achieve 
principle in the long run, then, we must employ non-principle. 
As these examples suggest, the path of reconciliation is trod pri-
marily by those disposed toward the common law culture.303  The En-
lightenment ideal does not provide the same leeway for compromise; 
it speaks of fixed principles, whereas the common law culture’s 
commitment to muddling through is spread across a range of prag-
matic doctrines.  Yet, even among those disposed toward the com-
mon law culture, the path of reconciliation is not a popular one.  
Sunstein claims that his theory of constitutional interpretation de-
scribes the analysis genuinely employed by courts.  This ignores, how-
ever, the Enlightenment rhetoric that has long accompanied our 
constitutional enterprise.  Courts may proceed in a manner con-
sistent with Sunstein’s theory, but their language is more complicat-
ed; oftentimes, it is hardly the language of reconciliation.  The same 
applies to scholarly visions of constitutional interpretation.  Our con-
 
298 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 3 (1975) (identifying with eighteenth-
century Whigs and Edmund Burke). 
299 BICKEL, supra note 53, at 244 (arguing that “the rule of principle in our society is neither 
precipitate nor uncompromising, that principle may be a universal guide but not a uni-
versal constraint, that leeway is provided to expediency along the path to, and alongside 
the path of, principle, and, finally, that principle is evolved conversationally not perfected 
unilaterally”). 
300 See id. at 111–18 (discussing mechanisms for avoiding decision, including standing doc-
trine, ripeness doctrine, and the related political-question doctrine). 
301 Id. at 205. 
302 Id. at 244. 
303 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court 1994 Term—Foreword:  Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. 
REV. 13, 16 (1995) (arguing that we should be wary of “calls to examine, or reexamine, 
first principles” that “raise the specter or embrace the exhilaration of radical rethink-
ing”). 
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stitutional discourse does not sound in reconciliation, but rather in 
contradiction. 
In a sense, this is not surprising.  Effectively segmenting the com-
mon law culture and the Enlightenment ideal is an unenviable task.  
Sunstein advances a series of factors to consult as to whether a return 
to first principles is appropriate.304  It is difficult to imagine a satisfy-
ing way to segment these two traditions in a manner that is not just 
weakly suggestive, like Sunstein’s.  Vagueness yields an imprecise divi-
sion, and an imprecise division reproduces the contradiction.  Simi-
larly, Bickel’s notion that principle requires unprincipled behavior 
does violence to deep-seated Enlightenment values about transparen-
cy and coherence.  Few scholars have defended his view of prudence, 
and many have lined up to criticize it.305  Moreover, both approaches 
highlight an unsettling contradiction long associated with our under-
standing of constitutionalism.  Accordingly, the contradiction per-
sists, albeit largely hidden from view. 
C.  The Path of Contradiction 
Like Sunstein, Dworkin describes his interpretive theory as the 
analysis genuinely employed by courts.  Sunstein argues that, contrary 
to the public imagination, courts do not rely on theory in constitu-
tional interpretation.306  Dworkin argues that, again contrary to the 
public imagination, courts do not ignore theory.307  One might won-
der how the public could hold such contradictory notions of constitu-
tional interpretation.  Yet there is indeed contradiction in how schol-
ars and courts navigate the boundaries between the common law 
culture and the Enlightenment ideal.  It is not merely that the culture 
and the ideal have coexisted since the Founding.  The two traditions 
have been apparent within the theories of constitutional meaning es-
poused by most participants in constitutional discourse.  That is, the 
Enlightenment ideal does not emerge as a myth solely upon viewing 
 
304 SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at 57 (looking to (1) judicial confidence 
in the merits, (2) whether a broad and deep decision would reduce costly uncertainty, (3) 
whether advance planning is important, and (4) whether a broad and deep decision 
would advance democratic goals). 
305 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
306 Sunstein argues that, “as a general rule, those involved in constitutional law tend to be 
cautious about theoretical claims.”  SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, supra note 279, at xi. 
307 According to Dworkin, “[l]awyers and judges, in their day-to-day work, instinctively treat 
the Constitution as expressing abstract moral requirements that can only be applied to 
concrete cases through fresh moral judgments.”  DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW, supra note 
44, at 3.  He argues, however, that “it would indeed be revolutionary for a judge openly to 
recognize the moral reading.”  Id. 
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our constitutional system as a whole; it emerges within nearly every 
theory of constitutional meaning that makes up that system. 
To see this, begin again with the Marshall Court.  Amidst Mar-
shall’s rhetoric about reasoning to constitutional truth, lay the as-
sumption that adjudication should follow the common law model.  
The Court invoked antecedents of justiciability doctrine, traditional 
notions of precedent, the distinction between holding and dicta, and 
the practice of writing separately.308  In so doing, it likely followed the 
“poorly-digested farrago of ideas, without inner logic,” that animated 
the Framers.309  Under many interpretive theories, the Court’s em-
brace of common law mechanisms was less a choice than a require-
ment.310  Requirement or not, the result combined Enlightenment 
rhetoric and common law constraints.  The Court simultaneously 
promoted and assailed mythology and disjunction.  It championed an 
abstract notion of constitutional principle while simultaneously re-
stricting its ability to recognize and affirm that principle. 
The notions of maintenance advanced by mid-nineteenth century 
theorists also betray an uneasy mingling of the tenets of Enlighten-
ment and the dictates of the common law culture.  In his Commen-
taries, for example, Justice Story located the “permanent principles” 
of constitutional government in common law notions of “[o]ur an-
cestors.”311  He did not explain why the common law would ensure 
such principles, nor did he contend, like Bickel, that genuine princi-
ple demands short-term departures from principle.  Similarly, John 
Norton Pomeroy both invoked first principles to reach “the 
truth . . . of the meaning of the Constitution”312 and derided “imprac-
ticable theorist[s]” that would do such a thing.313  Modern descend-
ents of these thinkers follow a similar pattern.  Justice Scalia invokes 
 
308 See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 405 (1821) (stating that the case-or-
controversy requirement in Article III limits the judicial power to “‘a case in law or equi-
ty,’ in which a right, under such law, is asserted in a Court of justice”); Alexander v. Balt. 
Ins. Co., 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 370, 379–82 (1808) (declining to follow dicta); Ex Parte Boll-
man, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 87–90 (1807) (invoking stare decisis).  For a discussion of the 
practice of writing separately in the Marshall Court, see supra notes 246–249 and accom-
panying text.  I do not mention retroactivity because that issue did not arise for the Mar-
shall Court given its Blackstonian view of the law.  See supra notes 225–227 and accompa-
nying text. 
309 Whitman, supra note 217, at 1367–68. 
310 That is, for theories that rely on some notion of original understanding, it would appear 
that the Marshall Court acted appropriately in implementing that understanding.  Of 
course, this quickly becomes something of a Pandora’s box.  Which common law mecha-
nisms did the Framers agree upon?  What would have constituted agreement?  And so on. 
311 1 STORY, supra note 116, at § 377. 
312 POMEROY, supra note 117, at § 148. 
313 Id. at § 140. 
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original intent as true constitutional meaning, but he confines his in-
quiries such that he often cannot reach that meaning.314 
The opposite pattern emerges among adherents to accounts of 
constitutional growth.  Although these theorists embrace the com-
mon law culture, they ground that embrace in Enlightenment rheto-
ric.  For Sidney George Fisher, the limits of human reason suggest 
that “the only safe foundation for government is custom” and gradu-
alism.315  He seeks to legitimate this view through what is, in essence, 
an appeal to the first principles of the Founding.  Fisher finds that 
the first principles of the Founding disclaimed first principles:  “Our 
ancestors,” he argues, “followed the English model as closely as they 
dared, not perhaps as closely as they wished.”316  C.G. Tiedeman and 
Woodrow Wilson similarly defend a system of common law growth on 
the grounds that it is dictated by the essence of our national charac-
ter.317  While these theorists invoke Enlightenment rhetoric in dis-
cerning constitutional meaning, their conclusions eschew the En-
lightenment ideal for the common law culture.  They call upon us to 
follow their prescriptions, but not their pattern of inquiry.  Indeed, 
they ignore the tension between these two strands. 
Consider once again the rise and fall of Lochner.  Although the 
judges that would enshrine Lochner invoked first principles, they did 
not do so in every case or with respect to every issue.  Their decisions 
very much inhabited the common law culture.  To employ a frame 
advanced by Richard H. Fallon, Lochner represents an “extraordinary 
case” in the sense that the Court saw it as a case that required an in-
quiry into first principles of constitutional governance.318  Yet, in 
many “ordinary cases,” the Court carried the torch of traditional 
 
314 It is in this sense that Scalia is a “faint-hearted originalist.”  Scalia, supra note 50, at 864.  
Not only does Scalia ignore original intent in some instances given his moral intuitions, as 
he acknowledges, but he also prevents himself from engaging a full inquiry into original 
intent. 
315 FISHER, supra note 120, at 17. 
316 Id. at 24. 
317 See TIEDEMAN, supra note 122, at 16 (“The constitution of a state may be described as the 
definition of the order and structure of the body politic, while constitutional law consists 
of those fundamental principles and rules in accordance with which the government is 
constructed and orderly administration is conducted.  Constitutional law may be de-
scribed as the anatomy and physiology of the body politic.”); WILSON, supra note 123, at 4 
(arguing that “the right of those who are governed to adjust government to their own 
needs and interests” is demonstrated in the Declaration of Independence). 
318 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword:  Implementing the Constitu-
tion, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 60 (1997).  Fallon distinguishes between “ordinary” cases in 
which “the Court applies the framework established by prior decisions” and “extraordi-
nary” cases in which the Court turns to a “fresh examination of underlying ‘first princi-
ples’” to address the issue.  Id. at 60–61 
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common law adjudication, invoking stare decisis, minimalism, and 
the like.319  The New Deal decisions that overturned Lochner follow the 
same pattern.  As it reversed course, the Court spoke of transcendent 
principle.  Yet it did not really return to first principles.  Rather, it left 
most of the existing constitutional superstructure both intact and un-
questioned.320  In these two shifts, the Court did little to explain the 
line between an ordinary case and an extraordinary one.  Rather, it 
proceeded as if the two genres of cases were one and the same:  a 
product of longstanding principle. 
Post-war constitutional theorists betray the same disconnect be-
tween rhetoric and reality.  Although Herbert Wechsler’s pursuit of 
neutral principles evokes the language of Enlightenment, Wechsler 
carefully noted that it could not displace common law notions of 
precedent.  Adherence to precedent need not hinder the task of pur-
suing neutral principles; precedent may play a role in assessing neu-
trality in much the same way it plays a role in Dworkin’s notion of in-
tegrity.  Yet Wechsler does not make this argument.  Instead, he 
merely cites Holmes’ remark that “imitation of the past, until we have 
a clear reason for change, no more needs justification than appe-
tite.”321  John Hart Ely reproduces a comparable dynamic.  Ely reasons 
to a vision of constitutional meaning that sounds in the Enlighten-
ment ideal, yet he expresses concern about projects that seek to un-
cover fundamental principles.  The result at once appeals to abstract 
reason and denigrates claims that “have the smell of the lamp about 
them.”322  Neither theory negotiates a relationship between culture 
and ideal; both leave their tension unacknowledged. 
Contemporary theorists espouse the Enlightenment ideal while 
tacitly advancing the common law culture.  Return to Ackerman and 
Michelman.  Ackerman has self-consciously taken up the cause of En-
lightenment.  The Framers, he says, “were hardly content with the 
Burkean arts of muddling through crises.”323  Through the notion of 
extra-textual amendment, Ackerman repackages the apparent con-
tradictions of our constitutional order into a coherent system domi-
nated by the will of the people.  Still, his account does not fully es-
 
319 Indeed, these strands are the substance of Justice Holmes’ famous dissent in Lochner.  See 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
“[g]eneral propositions do not decide concrete cases”). 
320 For one of the most far-reaching accounts of the New Deal revolution, see 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 255–311 (1998). 
321 Wechsler, supra note 52, at 17 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Holdsworth’s English Law, 
in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 285, 290 (1920)). 
322 ELY, supra note 137, at 59. 
323 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 31, at 20. 
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chew the “muddling through” of the common law culture.  The peo-
ple may speak outside of Article V, but courts interpret their utter-
ances subject to the forces of common law adjudication.324  In many 
ways, Michelman echoes Dworkin in his devotion to principle, albeit 
through dialogue.  For him, “[e]very norm, every time, requires ex-
planation and justification in context” through the “practical reason” 
of dialogue.325  Like Dworkin, however, Michelman does little to ad-
dress common law adjudication or how it may confine the dialogue 
he describes.326 
A clear picture emerges:  constitutional theorists promote the En-
lightenment ideal as a legal myth.  A study of nearly any opinion in-
terpreting the Constitution reveals that courts are hardly engaged in 
the enterprise of discerning transcendent constitutional meaning.  
Behind the court’s discussion, lies a vast landscape of assumptions it 
refuses to engage.  The litigants know that they may not question that 
landscape; they make their cases within the confines of the common 
law culture.  Scholars dissect cases within those confines.  Yet, when it 
comes to abstract discussions of constitutional meaning, rhetoric does 
not match reality.  The falsehood of the Enlightenment ideal, once 
uncovered, is readily apparent.  But, like the myth that law follows 
rules, the Enlightenment ideal reflects a desire transformed into be-
lief.327  It is not advanced as a convenient falsehood; it is advanced as a 
precondition for intelligent discourse about constitutional meaning. 
 
324 See id. at 86–99 (describing the process of intergenerational synthesis). 
325 Michelman, supra note 54, at 76. 
326 Michelman locates the common law culture within the nomos of our constitutional cul-
ture.  He states 
Judicial self-government, like all self-government, can occur only within a nomos, a 
cognizable normative universe that makes integrity conceivable.  In our judicial 
nomos there are strong norms of popular sovereignty, intragovernmental division 
of responsibility, and justice to parties—all of which demand attention to statutes, 
regulations, constitutional texts, precedents, and other embodiments of history. 
  Id.  In the next breath, however, he states that “[t]he norm of justice to parties itself 
commands that no other norm should ever take a form that preempts questions or ex-
empts reason-giving.”  Id.  In this statement, Michelman affirms the Enlightenment ideal. 
327 As Karl Llewlyen argued in 1934, “the theory that rules decide cases seems for a century 
to have fooled not only library-ridden recluses, but judges.”  Llewelyn, supra note 146, at 
7.  This desire, he argued, became a belief that altered the reasoning of decisions  
[f]or when changes in common law cumulate to the point where even the willful 
blind may be expected to perceive the change, some judge rewords ‘the’ rule into 
a wholly different rule tailored more neatly to the current course of decision:  one 
more device to save the face of an insolvent theory.   
  Id. at 10.  Nearly a century later, constitutional theorists continue to warn of the same self-
delusion.  See, e.g., Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term—Foreword:  Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution:  Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 111–12 (2003). 
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This is, no doubt, quite a strange state of affairs.  It is not only that 
the Court adheres to the common law culture within plain view; stare 
decisis, after all, is not a phrase known only to lawyers.  The ideologi-
cal divisions on the Court, aired in recurrent 5-4 decisions in high-
profile cases, cast serious doubt on the notion that our constitutional 
system is moored to some abstract truth.  Yet, as we have seen, doc-
trines like stare decisis can be employed within a theory of constitu-
tional meaning; ideological divisiveness, moreover, can be blamed on 
the ideological opponent:  if only they followed true constitutional 
meaning, there would not be such divisions.  The confirmation pro-
cess for Supreme Court justices dramatizes these strands.  Much is 
said of stare decisis and ideology.  But these discussions serve as a 
protracted effort of disclaiming the plausibility of deep interpretive 
agreement, restating the myth.328 
V.  THE IDEAL AS BENEFICIAL LEGAL MYTH 
Is this state of affairs desirable?  Perhaps this seems like the wrong 
question.  The task of constitutionalism, after all, is to enshrine a con-
stitutive mythology.  Good, bad, or otherwise, our constitutive my-
thology constitutes our constitutional system.  This response, howev-
er, ignores that arguments about constitutional theory necessarily 
involve considerations of their consequences.329  Accordingly, we must 
wrestle with the value of maintaining the Enlightenment ideal as a le-
gal myth rather than rendering it a legal fiction, disclaiming it, or 
disclaiming the common law culture.  This tradeoff is not easily 
avoided; after all, the Enlightenment ideal’s status as a legal myth 
runs counter to an ideal central to our constitutional discourse:  the 
Enlightenment ideal. 
Although we must question our constitutive mythology, we cannot 
ignore it.  It is the backdrop against which discussion of our constitu-
tional system takes place.  As I have argued, the common law culture 
and the Enlightenment ideal are firmly ingrained in our constitu-
tional discourse.  Theorists who purport to embrace the Enlighten-
ment ideal still recognize the conversational constraints of the com-
mon law culture.  Theorists who claim adherence to the common law 
 
328 For a telling account, see Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 919, 920 (1995) (book review) (arguing that the “nonanswer” discourse employed in 
the confirmation processes of Justices Ginsburg and Breyer raise more concerns than the 
politicized discourse employed during Robert Bork’s failed confirmation process). 
329 For a discussion of these considerations, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to 
Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 537 (1999). 
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culture nonetheless invoke Enlightenment to allay concerns that our 
constitutional order may take a wrong turn.  The few theorists that 
have sought to blend these traditions have garnered few followers.  
We need not accept the present expression of these patterns of con-
stitutional engagement, but it would be foolish to imagine that we 
might change them on a whim.    
 With this in mind, let us return to each of the three paths de-
scribed above:  absolutism, reconciliation, and contradiction. 
 Begin with absolutism.  From the foregoing, it should be clear that 
absolutism is a non-starter; this path wholly rejects our affinity for ei-
ther the culture or the ideal.  Even supposing that such a wholesale 
rejection could actually be achieved, moreover, neither the common 
law culture nor the Enlightenment ideal is an obvious choice.  The 
debate between Sunstein and Dworkin illustrates the point.  If we 
embraced the ideal, we would need to accept considerable legal in-
stability and profound problems of judicial competence.  If we em-
braced the common law culture, we would need to accept falsehood 
and inconsistency in constitutional interpretation.  Surely, tradeoffs 
like these are familiar.  Suffice it to say that neither culture nor ideal 
is self-evidently superior to the other and neither paints a satisfying 
picture in isolation.  In light of our collective unease with the absolut-
ist path, it does not seem to be the best choice.  
 Turn, then, to the path of reconciliation.  This path is a non-
starter for many of the same reasons.  Neither of the routes to recon-
ciliation described above envisions a genuine exchange between the 
culture and the ideal.  Sunstein divides the two strands topically; he 
sets boundaries by subject matter to govern whether we should follow 
culture or ideal.  Bickel divides the culture and the ideal temporally; 
he defends the culture as a short-term tool that enables us to fulfill 
the ideal in the long term.  These solutions do not resolve the under-
lying tension between culture and ideal.  Rather, they compart-
mentalize the two strands.  This is understandable; the culture and 
the ideal are diametrically opposed and thus defy reconciliation of 
any other kind.  The trouble with compartmentalization, however, is 
that it merely reproduces absolutism within compartments.  For rec-
onciliation to work, we must be willing to accept absolutism within 
certain boundaries. 
So long as we can agree on the rationale for a division, a patch-
work of absolutist compartments may be desirable.  This would allow 
us to reap some benefits of both the culture and the ideal.  It is not 
clear, however, that we can craft boundaries in a manner that is pre-
cise and satisfying.  Precision is necessary for genuine compartments; 
imprecise divisions will yield conflict at the borders.  Boundaries must 
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be satisfying so that we can live with them despite our conflicting al-
legiances to the culture and the ideal.  Neither Sunstein nor Bickel 
parts culture from ideal with precision; Sunstein advances a vague list 
of factors to govern when to invoke first principles, and Bickel does 
not elaborate when we should follow principle and when we should 
not.  Needless to say, neither scholar’s divisions have proved satisfying 
to other scholars.  This is unsurprising; if there is a satisfying way to 
precisely divide the inherently imprecise conflicts between truth and 
stability, depth and simplicity, and consistency and expediency, it has 
not revealed itself.      
 This leaves the path of contradiction.  The path of contradiction 
surely holds some allure; it allows us to reap the benefits of both the 
culture and the ideal without needing to navigate compartmentaliza-
tion.  But, this path has difficulties of its own.   
 Before we address them, let us first divide it into two sub-paths:  
that of patent contradiction and that of latent contradiction.  This di-
vision is straightforward; the patent contradiction is readily apparent 
to the public, while the latent contradiction goes undetected.  In the 
case of the patent contradiction, we might identify the contradiction 
in constitutional discourse or we might collectively recognize its pres-
ence even as it is nominally denied.  That is, the patent contradiction 
might be denoted as such or it might be recognized in a manner sim-
ilar to a legal fiction.  In the case of the latent contradiction, the con-
tradiction must evade public notice; it can be neither overtly identi-
fied nor implicitly recognized.  The latent contradiction, then, evokes 
a dynamic similar to the legal myth.  Contradiction presents difficul-
ties in both its latent and patent forms.   
 First, consider patent contradiction.  The trouble with this sub-
path is that it would expose disjunction at the core of most, if not all, 
of our theories of constitutional meaning.  This is true for theories 
that profess allegiance to the Enlightenment ideal as well as theories 
that profess allegiance to the common law culture.  For theories that 
profess allegiance to the Enlightenment ideal, it would expose the 
fact that constitutional practice is confined by the common law cul-
ture.  For theories that profess allegiance to the common law culture, 
it would expose the fact that the common law culture is not always so 
rigid a constraint.  In each case, we would see that the relevant theo-
ries do not follow their own commands, at least as the theories con-
ceive of them.  For theories that profess allegiance to some combina-
tion of the culture and the ideal, this sub-path will also yield 
disjunction.  There is a difference between reconciliation and con-
tradiction; such theories would thus fail to heed their stated interpre-
tive approach. 
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Of course, this sub-path would not expose disjunction in a consti-
tutional theory that called for contradiction.  For example, a theory 
might demand that we pay obeisance to the Enlightenment ideal but 
hew close to the constraints of the common law culture.  In such case, 
there would be no disjunction; the path of contradiction would be 
the path dictated by the constitutional theory.  On some level, most 
constitutional theories, at least as described here, may seem to follow 
this mold.  We might say, then, that the path of contradiction would 
reveal conjunction rather than disjunction.  These theories do not 
see themselves as favorable to contradiction, however.  That is, they 
fail to recognize that they embrace contradiction.  According to their 
terms, therefore, taking this sub-path would reveal disjunction, not 
conjunction.  As should be clear from the preceding Parts, I am una-
ware of any constitutional theory that so embraces contradiction. 
Consider an example of this dynamic.  Suppose you are an 
originalist.  You say that you are committed to an Enlightenment-style 
inquiry into the intent of the framers.  In practice, however, you con-
fine your analysis in accordance with the common law culture.  If we 
expose this contradiction, we will reveal that your interpretive ap-
proach does not follow the mantra it espouses.  We would not be re-
vealing a disjunction in the formal criteria your theory employs to re-
solve a particular case.  Rather, we would reveal that you do not 
actually advance the constitutional meaning dictated by original in-
tent.  We would reveal that you place roadblocks into your analysis 
that foreclose the possibility of arriving at that aim.  Even if these 
roadblocks are consistent with the intent of the Framers, they fore-
close your ability to vindicate their full constitutional vision.330 
What is so bad about exposing a disjunction like this one?  Ex-
posed disjunctions threaten the stability of a legal order for two pri-
mary reasons.  First, they cast doubt upon the notion that a constitu-
tional system follows an internal system of meaning.  If our 
constitutional theories do not follow their own demands, we must 
begin to ask ourselves whether our constitutional order is anything 
 
330 Justice Scalia acknowledges that  
[i]n its undiluted form, at least, [originalism] is medicine that seems too strong to 
swallow.  Thus, almost every originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of 
stare decisis—so that Marbury v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Ber-
ger should demonstrate unassailably that it got the meaning of the Constitution 
wrong.   
  Scalia, supra note 50, at 861.  Accordingly, Scalia might respond that the mantra of his 
notion of originalism is not original intent but rather originalism with stare decisis.  This 
belies, however, the rhetoric of originalism:  that true constitutional meaning lies in orig-
inal intent.  Scalia’s concern for precedent allows a departure from that meaning. 
May 2013] CONSTITUTIONAL INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM 1449 
 
more than the bald exercise of power.  In this sense, disjunction at-
tacks the bonds that makes constitutionalism possible.331  Second, ex-
posed disjunctions cast doubt upon the notion that a constitutional 
system can follow an internal system of meaning.  If a theory cannot 
follow its own commands, we must ask ourselves how we can call up-
on the notion of constitutionalism to bind us together into self-
government.  If we conceive of constitutionalism as a project that 
generates a shared system of meaning, this type of disjunction chal-
lenges the notion that constitutionalism could ever be possible, ex-
cept perhaps in the most homogenous of societies.332 
Now, consider the path of latent contradiction.  The great benefit 
of the latent contradiction is that it obscures these disjunctions.  This 
benefit, however, comes at the cost of honesty and transparency.  
There are three scenarios in which we would fail to perceive the con-
tradiction between the common law culture and the Enlightenment 
ideal.  First, we might believe that we follow the common law culture 
even though we do not.  Second, we might believe that we follow the 
Enlightenment ideal even though we do not.  Third, we might simply 
fail to recognize the tension between our allegiances to the culture 
and the ideal.  The third scenario may seem the least troubling, as it 
appears to rely on ignorance more than delusion.  Yet it is also the 
least plausible; if unhidden, the contradiction between the culture 
and the ideal is hard to ignore.  That is, latent contradiction would 
seem to require collective delusion of some sort.333  Accordingly, we 
 
331 For a discussion of the strands in constitutional discourse that police this division, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1 (1997).  The literature on this division is immense, but the idea is fairly simple:  
our constitutional order depends on some understanding that ours is a system “of laws, 
and not of men.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  As Fallon 
writes, a central element of the modern accounts of the rule of law is that “[p]eople must 
be able to understand the law and comply with it.”  Fallon, supra, at 8.  When a theory 
does not follow its own requirements, its account of law detracts from such understand-
ing. 
332 As Robert Cover argues, different communities generate systems of meaning that, “[l]et 
loose, . . . would be unstable and sectarian in their social organization, dissociative and 
incoherent in their discourse, wary and violent in their interactions.”  Cover, supra note 7, 
at 16.  Constitutionalism polices these interactions, whether it be through a homogenous 
hierarchy of values, or by legitimizing sub-communities within a larger framework.  Id. at 
67–68.  Exposed disjunction poses two threats in this regard.  First, it challenges the abil-
ity of a constitutional order to mediate between the sub-communities and currents that 
inhabit a society.  Second, it challenges the ability of sub-communities to generate a sus-
tainable system of meaning.  Together, these two forces threaten the disintegration of 
both the whole and its parts. 
333 Or, at the very least, ignoring the contradiction would require such a cognitive disso-
nance that in essence we would either be subscribing to one of these false beliefs or sub-
scribing to both of them at different points in time.  I do not delve into the possibility 
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must consider the tradeoff between false belief in the culture and 
false belief in the ideal. 
False belief in the common law culture would have few ad-
vantages.  It would eschew the notion that our constitutional order 
rests on first principles.  Instead, we would see constitutionalism as an 
incremental project of muddling through.  There would be no such 
thing as a wrong turn, at least as measured against deeper principles 
of meaning.  In practice, of course, constitutionalism would return to 
first principles occasionally.  A false belief in the preeminence of the 
common law culture would help legitimate these breaks with past 
practice, because they would be largely beyond attack once achieved.  
Adherence to the common law culture would also allay concerns 
about judges rejecting longstanding practices in the name of abstract 
notions of constitutional meaning.  It is difficult to imagine, however, 
that our constitutional system would adopt a false belief in the com-
mon law culture given the Founding’s Enlightenment rhetoric.  It is 
also difficult to imagine that this false belief would not be exposed for 
its falsehood.  The most recognizable constitutional acts are those 
that break with the past. 
False belief in the Enlightenment ideal evades these potential pit-
falls.  The ideal has deep roots in our origin myths.  It also compli-
ments our penchant to notice the extraordinary rather than the pe-
destrian.  More than that, false belief in the Enlightenment ideal 
carries considerable benefits; namely, it preserves the appearance 
that our constitutional order rests on principle.  This has two primary 
effects.  First, it counters concerns that constitutionalism is the bald 
exercise of power.  The Enlightenment ideal supports the notion that 
there is a correct answer to a constitutional question that derives 
from a consistent theory of meaning.334  Second, it obscures irrecon-
cilable value conflicts that, if exposed, would cast doubt upon the 
possibility of constitutionalism as a collective enterprise.  The En-
 
that subscribing to both of these false beliefs at different times might be a better course 
than consistently subscribing to one of them.  Such fragmented contradiction would be 
difficult to discuss cogently; there are so many possible permutations that weighing them 
within this calculus would be near impossible.  Accordingly, I assess the two extremes of 
subscribing to either the common law culture or the Enlightenment ideal as legal myths.  
I note here, however, that given my view that the ideal is on balance the better legal myth, 
I would imagine that if we advanced each of the legal myths in different contexts, adher-
ence to the ideal as legal myth would generally be preferable. 
334 Although this notion is often seen as quaint if not dangerous, it is a recurrent desire in 
our constitutional discourse.  For a critique of the idea that there can be a correct answer 
to a constitutional question, see, for example, DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, 
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY:  THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
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lightenment ideal allows us to believe that apparent rejections of our 
core values are mere missteps that fail to capture the true meaning of 
our constitutional system.335  These two benefits smooth over weak-
nesses in our constitutional order that are threatened by the possibil-
ity of exposed disjunction. 
As a legal myth, the Enlightenment ideal generates a narrative 
that preserves the possibility that a wide array of constitutional view-
points will be vindicated.  When we see a decision that contravenes 
our vision of constitutional meaning, we hold out hope that it will be 
reversed in short order.  We may even enter the courts to ensure that 
it is reversed.  If time passes and the decision remains binding law, we 
may consider either amending the Constitution or amending our 
constitutional theory.  The decision might cast portions of our theory 
into doubt, but it need not cast doubt on the notion of fidelity to 
genuine constitutional meaning; vindication is always around the 
corner.336  This conviction allows us to preserve both an essential ap-
pearance of consistent constitutional meaning and an essential ambi-
guity in the content of that meaning.  Together, these forces enable 
constitutional legitimacy amidst profound contestation of constitu-
tional meaning. 
Let us pause on the assertion that our constitutional democracy 
requires a certain ambiguity.  It is fairly uncontroversial that ambigui-
ty is sometimes necessary to strike a compromise between competing 
viewpoints.337  The ambiguity I refer to here is more complex, howev-
 
335 Guido Calabresi has described this possibility with particular eloquence.  In some in-
stances, he writes  
one must seek solutions in which—though one set of ideals and beliefs will win the 
particular case (that cannot be avoided)—the victory will not reject as invalid or 
outside our law the ideals, beliefs, and values (yes, even the metaphysics) of the 
losing group.  Because such solutions respect both the winning and the losing 
metaphysics, they look to a time when it may be possible to accommodate both 
sets of beliefs.  Even if such a time never comes to be, they serve to place the bur-
den of the immediate result on all of us rather than just on the losers.   
  GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW:  PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES 
ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 97–98 (1985). 
336 In a sense, the notion of “democratic constitutionalism” is a conscious expression of the 
process in which groups affirm their collective hope that true constitutional meaning is 
just around the corner.  See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:  Democratic Constitutional-
ism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 375 (2007) (arguing that “[w]hen citi-
zens speak of their most passionately held commitments in the language of a shared con-
stitutional tradition, they invigorate that tradition” such that “even resistance to judicial 
interpretation can enhance the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy”). 
337 This does not mean that these legislative compromises are particularly celebrated.  See, 
e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders:  The 
Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) 
(defending ambiguous legislative compromises and noting that formal legal doctrine 
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er; it encompasses an intertemporal ambiguity.  As Calabresi and 
Bobbitt have argued, some value conflicts must be obscured from col-
lective consciousness such that the social fabric does not rip apart.  
An ambiguous compromise cannot obscure such conflicts so long as 
it is perceived as a compromise.338  The Enlightenment ideal preserves 
a healthy sense of intertemporal uncertainty.  Even if a group believes 
an interpretation rejects its most foundational values, the ideal helps 
preserve the group’s faith that those values will be vindicated eventu-
ally.  A decision may expose the conflict, but its conclusions are mere-
ly a temporary articulation of a deeper, contested, constitutional 
meaning.339  A commitment to vindicating true constitutional mean-
ing binds us together even as irreconcilable value conflicts threaten 
to tear us apart.340 
Of course, there are limits to the benefits of the Enlightenment 
ideal as legal myth.  Although it may help legitimate the constitution-
al enterprise, the Enlightenment ideal paints the courts as a political 
battleground where the battle is never truly won.  In this sense, the 
Enlightenment ideal may actually threaten the view that our constitu-
tional order is based in principle; it leads us to contest articulations of 
constitutional meaning.341  Moreover, given that the common law cul-
ture enshrines views we sometimes believe misconstrue true constitu-
tional meaning, it is difficult to ignore that our constitutional order 
 
“frames legislative ambiguity as a problem to be solved rather than an opportunity to be 
exploited”). 
338 Calabresi and Bobbitt argue that to resolve choices between resource allocations that im-
plicate irreconcilable values, we “must attempt to make allocations in ways that preserve 
the moral foundations of social collaboration” in ways that “do[] not appear to implicate 
moral contradictions.”  CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 166, at 18.  However, “unless the 
values held in tension have changed, the illusion that denies their conflict gives way and 
the transformation will only have been a postponement.  When actions are again focused 
on the tragic choice, action will again be required.”  Id. 
339 In this sense, the Enlightenment ideal achieves precisely what Calabresi calls for in clash-
es between moral beliefs:  it “preserves the moralisms which lose out in the conflict.”  
CALABRESI, supra note 335, at 92.  It is not only that “the loser may be more willing to ac-
cept the loss if losing does not mean that society will become callous to the values he or 
she held.”  Id.  Even the appearance of a final decision, in light of the Enlightenment ide-
al, may always be subject to question. 
340 To make this cohesion possible, courts must give voice to the rejected constitutional 
meanings, such that proponents of the vindicated meaning might reconsider their views.  
For an intricate discussion of the way in which the Court can show us how “opportunities 
for communal reconciliation might be grasped,” see Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law 
and the Teaching of Parables, 93 YALE. L.J. 455, 502 (1984). 
341 And, it leads us to ask, like Charles Fried, if we can place decisions by the Court’s “liberal 
and conservative [voting] blocs” within “any coherent set of doctrinal or jurisprudential 
principles.”  Charles Fried, Five to Four:  Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. 
REV. 163, 195 (2002). 
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does not actually follow the Enlightenment ideal.  That realization 
threatens to prompt disillusionment with our constitutional process-
es.342  Moreover, the temporal ambiguity enabled by the Enlighten-
ment ideal can only do so much as time passes.  Even if we believe 
that our view of true constitutional meaning will be vindicated, we 
may need to endure such prolonged rejections of a foundational val-
ue that it becomes clear that the society we inhabit is no longer of the 
Constitution to which we adhere.343 
Perhaps worse, the Enlightenment ideal as legal myth is, nonethe-
less, a legal myth.  In some sense, it is a lie, even if a lie that we turn 
upon ourselves.344  For some, rooting out dishonesty may be the first 
priority, consequences be damned.345  This is a tough position to ar-
gue against.  All one can say is that the Enlightenment ideal as legal 
myth, dishonesty and all, may be the best way to navigate the tension 
between our allegiance to Enlightenment principle and the common 
law culture.  We can only reach this conclusion through a weighing of 
the importance of honesty, so there is no foolproof way to defend the 
Enlightenment ideal as legal myth against this attack.  A proxy, how-
ever, lies in the constitutive mythology we have built around constitu-
tionalism since the Founding and that we continue to build today.  
The falsehood inherent within the Enlightenment ideal has been 
readily apparent since the Founding.  It is the substance of nearly 
every discussion of legal doctrine, whether the doctrine is gnarled or 
straightforward.  Yet we continue to avert our eyes.  We repeat the old 
pleasantries, and the legal myth persists. 
This dynamic should help reduce concerns about the Enlighten-
ment ideal as legal myth and highlight its strengths.  Surely, we may 
train an unhealthy amount of attention on the workings of the Su-
preme Court, and we may descend occasionally into the throngs of 
legal nihilism.  On the whole, however, faith in the presence of prin-
ciple beneath our constitutional system has helped weather irrecon-
 
342 If not, indeed, a descent into legal nihilism.  See generally Joseph William Singer, The Play-
ers and the Cards:  Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984). 
343 Consider, for example, the suspension of disbelief required for abolitionists and civil-
rights activists to struggle for a vision of the Constitution compromised by slavery and seg-
regation. 
344 See, e.g., “A man who lies to himself is blameworthy because he acts with knowledge of the 
facts and thus may be held responsible for his erroneous belief.”  Raphael Demos, Lying to 
Oneself, 57 J. PHIL. 588, 589 (1960)). 
345 Kant’s view of lying follows this mold.  See Christine M. Korsgaard, The Right to Lie:  Kant 
on Dealing with Evil, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 325, 326 (1986).  For a more recent, if less cate-
gorical, critique of lying, see SISSELA BOK, LYING:  MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
LIFE (1978). 
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cilable constitutional disagreements and maintained social confi-
dence in a larger constitutional enterprise.  It has done so even when 
that faith is not quite warranted—even when our individual constitu-
tional theories are recognizably inconsistent and our collective con-
stitutional doctrine is recognizably incoherent.  In this, there is rea-
son to the apparent un-reason of the contradiction between the 
Enlightenment ideal and common law culture, and there is reason to 
the delusion that allows that contradiction to persist. 
CONCLUSION 
Suppose, then, that you have begun your descent from Sinai.  I 
have argued that you would be ill-advised to reveal the legal myth of 
the Enlightenment ideal.  If there is one legal myth that would be 
best left unmentioned, perhaps there are more.  Indeed, I have ar-
gued that the legal myth of the Enlightenment ideal obscures legal 
myths that pervade all of our theories of constitutional interpretation.  
Your views on this, of course, will depend on your view of the truth 
about our constitutional enterprise and how that truth translates into 
constitutional meaning.  In this Article, I have necessarily made 
claims about constitutional truth, though I have labored to make 
those claims as minimal as possible.  I have sought to avoid all claims 
about constitutional meaning.  It is you, after all, who is empowered 
by the vision on Sinai.  Or, if not by the vision on Sinai, some vision 
nonetheless.  Of course, your vision may cast doubt on my vision.  To 
this, I have no response.  I can only hope that my limited vision can 
withstand yours. 
You may wonder why I would labor to expose a legal myth only to 
argue that it remain unexposed.  The importance of the Enlighten-
ment ideal as legal myth does not depend upon a total lack of aware-
ness.  It depends on our collective persistence in leaving it generally 
unacknowledged and unnoticed.  This does not mean that constitu-
tional theorists should wholly ignore it.  In seeing the contradiction 
between the common law culture and the Enlightenment ideal, the 
constitutional theorist may grapple with how to address the dilemmas 
of constitutional interpretation it circumscribes.  Or, she may labor, 
my views notwithstanding, to transform our constitutional order such 
that it would hardly resemble our present order.  Perhaps you find it 
troubling that these two possibilities do not envision a collective con-
stitutional conversation.  This is natural.  As I have argued, we value 
both truth and obscurantism.  It should not be surprising that both of 
these forces would even shape how we address our engagement with 
them. 
